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1. Introduction	  	  From	  literal	  interpretation	  to	  a	  liberal	  rewriting	  of	  the	  UK	  tax	  code	  –	  how	  could	  it	  be	   possible	   to	   go	   from	   one	   extreme	   in	   Duke	   of	   Westminster	   to	   the	   other	   in	  
Vodafone	  2?	  	  	  	  When	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   handed	   down	   its	   judgment	   in	   the	  Vodafone	   2	   case,	  many	   commentators1	  could	  not	  understand	  how	   it	   felt	   able	   to	   read	  words	   into	  the	   statute	  which	  were	  not	  even	  printed	   in	  black	  and	  white.	   	   It	   is	  one	   thing	   to	  adopt	  differing	  interpretations	  of	  words	  one	  can	  read,	  but	  quite	  another	  to	  read	  in	  words	   that	   are	   nowhere	   to	   be	   seen.	   	  With	   this	   in	  mind,	   this	   paper	   seeks	   to	  explain	   and	   analyse	   the	   judicial	   journey	   from	   one	   end	   of	   the	   interpretative	  spectrum	  to	  the	  other.	  	  The	   analysis	   is	   divided	   into	   distinct	   sections.	   	   Firstly,	   the	   paper	   reviews	   the	  evolution	   of	   domestic	   conforming	   interpretation	   jurisprudence	   in	   the	   field	   of	  direct	  tax,	  starting	  with	  Duke	  of	  Westminster,	  and	  tracing	  through	  to	  more	  recent	  cases	  such	  as	  Astall	  and	  Mayes.	  	  It	  is	  not	  the	  intention	  to	  furnish	  the	  reader	  with	  a	  full	  history	  of	  the	  development	  of	  jurisprudence	  in	  the	  area	  of	  tax	  avoidance,	  but	  these	   cases	   do	   provide	   a	   relevant	   basis	   from	   which	   to	   develop	   the	   further	  analysis.	  	  Secondly,	  the	  paper	  addresses	  the	  question	  of	  the	  supremacy	  of	  EU	  law.	  	  In	  this	  section,	  it	  reviews	  the	  content	  of	  the	  European	  Communities	  Act	  1972;	  the	  Act	  of	  Parliament	   which	   ratified	   the	   UK’s	   accession	   to	   the	   European	   Economic	  Community	   in	   1973,	   and	   analyses	   what	   impact	   this	   had	   on	   the	   area	   of	  parliamentary	  sovereignty	  and	  competence.	  	  It	  then	  considers	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  the	  ECJ	  in	  respect	  of	  EU	  law	  supremacy,	  looking	  at	  cases	  such	  as	  Filipiak	  which	  relates	  to	  the	  freedom	  of	  establishment	  but	  also	  considering	  the	  key	  supremacy	  case	  law	  of	  the	  ECJ.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Including	  the	  author	  -­‐	  see	  Wellens	  (Pt	  2),	  p.5.	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In	   the	   next	   section,	   the	   focus	   remains	   with	   the	   ECJ’s	   jurisprudence,	   but	   the	  emphasis	   shifts	   to	   its	   approach	   to	   conforming	   interpretation.	   	   The	   paper	  considers	   the	   key	   cases	   which	   established	   the	   principle	   of	   conforming	  interpretation	  in	  the	  ECJ	  such	  as	  von	  Colson	  and	  looks	  at	  how	  that	  principle	  has	  been	   maintained	   and	   reasserted.	   	   Following	   this,	   the	   paper	   then	   turns	   its	  attention	  to	  how	  the	  UK	  courts	  view	  EU	  law	  supremacy.	  	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  the	  topic	  is	  conforming	  interpretation	  of	  the	  UK	  tax	  code	  in	  the	  field	  of	  EU	  law.	  	  This	  section	  brings	  together	  the	  principles	  which	  have	  thus	  far	   been	   discussed	   and	   explored,	   and	   analyses	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   they	   have	  been	   applied	   to	   jurisprudence	   in	   the	   tax	   field.	   	   This	   forms	   the	   basis	   for	   a	  subsequent	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  the	  Vodafone	  2	  case	  and	  the	  principles	  of	  conforming	   interpretation	  which	  are	  contained	   therein.	   	  Finally,	   the	  paper	  also	  considers	   a	   recent	   decision	   of	   the	   High	   Court	   in	   Thin	   Cap	   GLO	   where	   the	  principles	   clarified	   in	   Vodafone	   2	   were	   examined	   but	   ultimately	   a	   different	  conclusion	  was	  reached.	  	  	  	  
2. Conforming	  interpretation	  in	  UK	  domestic	  direct	  tax	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  examining	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  introduce	  a	  new	  exception	   into	   the	   CFC	   legislation,	   it	   is	   helpful	   to	   re-­‐visit	   the	   domestic	   view	  of	  conforming	  interpretation.	  	  Although	  domestic	  jurisprudence	  in	  direct	  tax	  affairs	  does	   not	   exist	   in	   a	   vacuum	   (interpretation	   of	   the	   statute	   is	   practised	   in	  many	  areas	  of	  law),	  there	  is	  a	  body	  of	  case	  law	  relating	  specifically	  to	  interpretation	  of	  direct	  tax	  statues.	  	  	  
2.1. Duke	  of	  Westminster	  –	  letter	  of	  the	  law	  	  The	   generally	   accepted	   progression	   of	   interpretation	   of	   tax	   law	   jurisprudence	  starts	  with	  Duke	  of	  Westminster	  where	  a	  structure	   for	  payment	  of	  wages	   in	  the	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form	  of	  covenants	  was	  put	  in	  place	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  surcharge	  tax.	  	  The	  House	  of	  Lords	  ruled	  that	  such	  an	  arrangement	  was	   legitimate	  and	  that	   it	   fell	  within	  the	  literal	  interpretation	  of	  the	  relevant	  statute:	  	  
“Every	  man	  is	  entitled	  to	  arrange	  his	  affairs	  so	  that	  the	  tax	  attaching	  
under	   the	   appropriate	   Acts	   is	   less	   than	   it	   could	   be...	   This	   so-­called	  
doctrine	  of	  "the	  substance"	  seems	  to	  me	  to	  be	  nothing	  more	  than	  an	  
attempt	  to	  make	  a	  man	  pay	  notwithstanding	  that	  he	  has	  so	  ordered	  
his	   affairs	   that	   the	   amount	   of	   tax	   sought	   from	   him	   is	   not	   legally	  
claimable.”2	  	  	  	  
2.2. Ramsay	  –	  substance	  over	  form?	  	  Things	   have	   evolved	   since	   the	   substance	   of	   a	   transaction	   was	   so	   robustly	  rejected	  in	  the	  Duke	  of	  Westminster	  judgment.	  	  The	  Ramsay	  doctrine	  is	  now	  well	  established	  in	  UK	  domestic	  jurisprudence,	  bringing	  a	  purposive	  approach	  to	  the	  interpretation	   of	   tax	   legislation.	   	   In	   Ramsay,	   the	   taxpayer	   sought	   to	   offset	   an	  existing	  taxable	  gain	  by	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  corresponding	  loss3.	  	  	  	  The	  series	  of	  steps	  put	  in	  place	  in	  Ramsay,	  each	  evaluated	  on	  an	  individual	  basis,	  produced	  such	  an	  effect.	   	  However,	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  ruled	  that	  where	  such	  a	  series	  of	   steps	   served	  no	   commercial	  purpose	  other	   than	   to	  avoid	   tax,	   it	   is	   the	  overall	   effect	   of	   the	   transaction	   as	   a	   whole	   that	   should	   be	   taxed,	   and	   not	   the	  individual	  steps.	  	  	  	  The	  core	  of	  the	  judgment	  in	  Ramsay	  rested	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  was	  no	  longer	  a	  requirement	  to	  literally	  interpret	  the	  tax	  statute;	  it	  was	  permissible	  for	  the	  court	  to	  take	  a	  purposive	  approach	  and	  interpret	  the	  law	  in	  light	  of	  what	  it	  was	  trying	  to	  achieve.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  19	  TC	  490	  at	  520	  3	  See	  Way,	  pp.65-­‐68	  for	  a	  description	  of	  the	  facts	  in	  Ramsay.	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2.3. Barclays	  Mercantile	  and	  Scottish	  Provident	  –	  the	  narrowness	  and	  breadth	  
of	  the	  Ramsay	  principle	  	  	  This	  concept	  was	  refined	  in	  Barclays	  Mercantile	  where	  the	  point	  in	  question	  was	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  finance	  lessor,	   in	  purchasing	  an	  asset,	  had	  incurred	  qualifying	  expenditure	   which	   entitled	   it	   to	   capital	   allowances	   under	   the	   relevant	   UK	  legislation,	   where	   complex	   security	   arrangements	   in	   the	   related	   lease	  transaction	  meant	   that	   the	   funds	   used	   by	   the	   lessor	   to	   acquire	   the	   asset	  were	  made	  available	  on	  the	  same	  day	  to	  an	  affiliate	  company.	  	  In	  its	  ruling,	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  fell	  back	  on	  a	  purposive	  approach	  to	  the	  statute	  which	   looked	   solely	   at	   the	   treatment	   of	   the	   party	   incurring	   the	   capital	  expenditure	   and	   which	   was	   not	   concerned	   with	   the	   remaining	   “transaction	  steps”.	   	   The	   House	   of	   Lords	   did	   qualify	   its	   ruling	   by	   explaining	   that	   Ramsay	  required	   the	   courts	   to	   give	   a	   purposive	   construction	   to	   the	   statute	   and	   then	  determine	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   transaction	   in	   question	   fell	   within	   such	   a	  construction.	   	  As	   such,	   it	  may	  still	  be	  possible	   to	  apply	   statutory	  provisions	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  end	  result	  of	  a	  series	  of	  transactions4.	  	  Just	  such	  an	  approach	  was	  taken	  in	  Scottish	  Provident,	  in	  which	  the	  taxpayer	  had	  acquired	  two	  options	  over	  Gilts	  which,	  if	  exercised,	  would	  cancel	  each	  other	  out	  for	   economic	   purposes,	   but	   would	   generate	   a	   loss	   for	   tax	   purposes.	   	   In	   this	  instance,	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  ruled	  that	  there	  was	  a	  practical	  certainty	  of	  the	  two	  options	  being	  exercised	  at	  the	  same	  time	  and	  therefore	  felt	  able	  to	  disregard	  the	  “commercially	  irrelevant	  contingencies”,	  and	  thus	  deny	  the	  tax	  deduction5.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Mortimer,	  p.445	  5	  ibid.,	  p.446	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2.4. Astall	  and	  Mayes	  –	  the	  limits	  of	  purposive	  interpretation6	  	  
Astall	   and	  Mayes	   are	   two	   cases	   which	   at	   first	   glance	   seem	   to	   contradict	   one	  another	   but	   yet	   go	   some	   way	   to	   confirming	   the	   principle	   of	   purposive	  interpretation.	  	  In	   Astall,	   the	   taxpayer	   entered	   into	   a	   pre-­‐arranged	   scheme	   that	   involved	   the	  subscription	   for	   debt	   securities	   where,	   in	   the	   event	   of	   an	   early	   redemption,	   a	  “deep	   gain”	   would	   have	   been	   recognised	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   the	   UK	   relevant	  discounted	   securities	   legislation.	   	   However,	   the	   terms	   upon	   which	   the	   debt	  securities	  could	  be	  redeemed	  altered	  drastically	  where	  an	  “exchange	  rate	  event”	  occurred.	  	  The	  probability	  of	  such	  an	  event	  taking	  place	  was	  calculated	  at	  around	  85%.	  	  	  	  In	  such	  circumstances,	  the	  redemption	  value	  of	  the	  debt	  securities	  was	  amended	  so	  as	  to	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  tax	  loss	  (but	  no	  corresponding	  economic	  loss)	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  original	  subscriber.	  	  The	  analysis	  of	  the	  case	  turned	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  debt	   securities	   could	   be	   classified	   as	   relevant	   discounted	   securities	   for	   the	  purposes	  of	  Schedule	  13	  of	  the	  Finance	  Act	  1996.	  	  The	  Special	  Commissioners,	  High	  Court	  and	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  all	   in	  turn	  rejected	  this	  argument	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  there	  was	  no	  realistic	  prospect	  of	  the	  securities	  being	  redeemed	  at	  anything	  other	  than	  a	  loss.	  	  In	  so	  ruling,	  the	  courts	  reaffirmed	  the	   “commercially	   irrelevant	   contingencies”	   principle	   referred	   to	   in	   Scottish	  
Provident.	  	  
Mayes	   related	   to	   the	   relief	   available	   to	   holders	   of	   life	   assurance	   policies	   upon	  partial	  surrender	  of	  such	  policies.	  	  In	  the	  present	  case,	  the	  UK	  taxpayer	  was	  not	  the	  holder	  of	   the	   life	  assurance	  policies	  when	   they	  were	  partially	  surrendered;	  they	  were	  held	  by	  a	  Luxembourg	   resident	   company	   that	  did	  not	   suffer	  any	  UK	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  See	  Mortimer,	  pp.446-­‐449	  and	  Harrison	  &	  Bates,	  p.4.	  for	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  facts	  and	  further	  analysis	  of	  Astall	  and	  Mayes.	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tax.	   The	   UK	   taxpayer	   did	   however	   later	   acquire	   these	   policies	   and	   made	   a	  corresponding	  claim	  for	  deficiency	  relief.	  	  The	   High	   Court	   ruled7	  that	   the	   legislation	   as	   drafted	   did	   not	   consider	   the	  consequences	  of	  applying	  deficiency	  relief	   in	  circumstances	  where	  both	  parties	  to	   a	   transaction	  were	  not	  UK	   taxpayers,	   and	  was	   very	  prescriptive	   in	   terms	  of	  what	   is	  was	   trying	   to	   achieve8.	   	   As	   a	   result,	   it	   allowed	   the	   appeal,	   citing9	  Lord	  Hoffmann’s	  2005	  article	  on	  tax	  avoidance	  and	  purposive	  construction:	  	  
“It	   is	   one	   thing	   to	   give	   a	   statute	   a	   purposive	   construction.	   It	   is	  
another	  to	  rectify	  the	  terms	  of	  highly	  prescriptive	  legislation	  in	  order	  
to	   include	   provisions	   which	  might	   have	   been	   included	   but	   are	   not	  
actually	  there.”10	  	  	  
2.5. Domestic	  interpretation	  –	  some	  observations	  	  This	   evolution	   of	   the	   domestic	   courts’	   thinking	   in	   respect	   of	   conforming	  interpretation	  –	  particularly	  in	  the	  field	  of	  direct	  tax	  –	  shows	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  interpretation	  is	  constantly	  developing,	  and	  that	  a	  literal	  interpretation	  of	  the	  tax	  statue	   as	   demonstrated	   in	   Duke	   of	   Westminster	   has	   to	   a	   large	   extent	   been	  usurped	  by	  a	  more	  purposive,	  almost	  pragmatic,	  approach	  to	  interpretation.	  	  Having	  said	  that,	  whereas	  Ramsay	  seems	  to	  go	  quite	  far	  in	  extending	  the	  courts’	  ability	   to	   interpret	   legislation,	   this	   was	   tempered	   by	   Barclays	   Mercantile.	  	  Furthermore,	  Scottish	  Provident	  and	  Astall	   seemed	  to	  give	  additional	  powers	   to	  the	  courts	  to	  consider	  the	  commercial	  reality	  of	  a	  transaction.	  	  Yet	  is	  it	  clear	  that,	  even	  up	  to	  the	  present	  day,	  there	  is	  still	  juridical	  debate	  over	  what	   constitutes	   interpretation	   of	   the	   legislation	   and	   this	   is	   evident	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  [2009]	  EWHC	  2443	  (Ch)	  at	  22	  8	  Harrison	  &	  Bates,	  p.4	  9	  [2009]	  EWHC	  2443	  (Ch)	  at	  30	  10	  [2005]	  BTR	  197	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opposing	  views	   reached	   in	  Astall	  and	  Mayes	  which,	   ostensibly,	  were	   looking	  at	  the	  same	  points	  of	  interpretation	  (i.e.	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  pre-­‐arranged	  transaction	  step	  should	  be	  disregarded	  under	  the	  Ramsay	  principle).	  	  	  This	  line	  of	  domestic	  case	  law	  provides	  some	  of	  the	  backdrop	  for	  the	  decision	  of	  the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   in	   Vodafone	   2,	   but	   it	   does	   not	   give	   the	   full	   picture.	   	   The	  essential	   extra	   element	  of	   this	   case	   is	   the	  EU	  dimension.	   	  Where	   a	   company	   is	  exercising	   its	   Treaty	   right	   to	   freedom	   of	   establishment,	   it	   is	   not	   sufficient	   to	  examine	   only	   the	   domestic	   jurisprudence;	   the	   domestic	   courts	   must	   also	  consider	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  the	  ECJ.	  	  	  
3. The	  supremacy	  of	  EU	  law	  	  	  The	   starting	   point	   for	   any	   analysis	   of	   the	   impact	   of	   ECJ	   jurisprudence	   on	   the	  domestic	  direct	   tax	  statute	   is	   the	  assumed	  overriding	  principle	   that	  Parliament	  retains	  sovereignty	  over	  its	  own	  affairs;	  that	  it	  can	  do	  anything	  other	  than	  bind	  itself	   for	   the	   future11.	   	   However,	   equally	   clear	   is	   the	   principle	   that	   the	   UK	  operates	  a	  dualist	  approach	   to	   international	   law	  and	  that	   international	   treaties	  ratified	  by	  the	  UK	  are	  not	  part	  of	  the	  domestic	  statute	  and	  must	  be	  incorporated	  through	  Parliament12.	  	  This	  contrasts	  with	  the	  monist	  approach	  adopted	  in	  some	  jurisdictions13,	  where	  treaties	  may	  become	  part	  of	  domestic	  law	  once	  concluded,	  without	  any	  separate	  requirement	  for	  domestic	  legislation14.	  	  Following	  the	  UK’s	  dualist	   approach,	   the	   Act	   of	   Parliament	   which	   incorporated	   the	   terms	   and	  conditions	  of	  the	  UK’s	  entry	  into	  the	  EEC	  in	  1973	  was	  the	  European	  Communities	  Act	  1972.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Craig	  in	  Jowell	  &	  Oliver,	  p.92	  12	  Craig	  &	  De	  Búrca,	  p.365	  &	  Baker,	  pp.21-­‐22	  13	  For	  example,	  Poland.	  	  See	  Aust,	  p.148	  for	  details.	  14	  Aust,	  p.146	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3.1. The	  European	  Communities	  Act	  1972	  	  S2(1)	  ECA	  1972	  reads:	  	  
“All	  such	  rights,	  powers,	  liabilities,	  obligations	  and	  restrictions	  from	  
time	  to	  time	  created	  or	  arising	  by	  or	  under	  the	  Treaties,	  and	  all	  such	  
remedies	  and	  procedures	  from	  time	  to	  time	  provided	  for	  by	  or	  under	  
the	  Treaties,	  as	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Treaties	  are	  without	  further	  
enactment	   to	   be	   given	   legal	   effect	   or	   used	   in	   the	   United	   Kingdom	  
shall	   be	   recognised	   and	   available	   in	   law,	   and	   be	   enforced,	   allowed	  
and	   followed	   accordingly;	   and	   the	   expression	   “enforceable	  
Community	  right”	  and	  similar	  expressions	  shall	  be	  read	  as	  referring	  
to	  one	  to	  which	  this	  subsection	  applies.”	  	  This	   section	  provides	   for	   an	  en	  bloc	   incorporation	  of	  EU	   law	   into	  domestic	  UK	  law,	   but	   crucially	   it	   also	   allows	   for	   the	   adoption	  of	   future	  EU	   law,	   through	   the	  construct	  ‘from	  time	  to	  time	  provided	  for’15.	  	  The	  Act	  goes	  on	  to	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  Parliamentary	  sovereignty	  in	  s2(4),	  the	  key	  part	  of	  which	  reads:	  	  
“The	   provision	   that	   may	   be	   made	   under	   subsection	   (2)	   above	  
includes,	  subject	  to	  Schedule	  2	  to	  this	  Act,	  any	  such	  provision	  (of	  any	  
such	   extent)	   as	   might	   be	   made	   by	   Act	   of	   Parliament,	   and	   any	  
enactment	   passed	   or	   to	   be	   passed,	   other	   than	   one	   contained	   in	  
this	  Part	  of	  this	  Act,	  shall	  be	  construed	  and	  have	  effect	  subject	  to	  
the	  foregoing	  provisions	  of	  this	  section.”16	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Turpin	  &	  Tomkins,	  p.319	  16	  Author’s	  emphasis	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The	   language	   contained	   in	   s2(4)	   ECA	   1972	   serves	   to	   ensure	   that	   any	   Act	   of	  Parliament	   previously	   passed,	   or	   which	   is	   passed	   in	   the	   future,	   should	   be	  interpreted	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  comply	  with	  EU	  law17.	  	  Furthermore,	  s3(1)	  ECA	  1972	  states:	  	  
“For	   the	   purposes	   of	   all	   legal	   proceedings	   any	   question	   as	   to	   the	  
meaning	   or	   effect	   of	   any	   of	   the	   Treaties,	   or	   as	   to	   the	   validity,	  
meaning	  or	  effect	  of	  any	  Community	  instrument,	  shall	  be	  treated	  as	  
a	  question	  of	  law	  (and,	  if	  not	  referred	  to	  the	  European	  Court,	  be	  for	  
determination	  as	   such	   in	  accordance	  with	   the	  principles	   laid	  down	  
by	  and	  any	  relevant	  decision	  of	  the	  European	  Court).”	  	  This	   section	   of	   the	   Act	   ensures	   that	   not	   only	  must	   the	   domestic	   courts	   follow	  their	  own	  jurisprudence	  when	  ruling	  on	  points	  of	   law,	  they	  must	  also	  take	  into	  account	  any	  relevant	  jurisprudence	  of	  the	  ECJ.	  	  This	   effect	   has	   not	   been	   lost	   on	   the	   judiciary,	   as	   observed	  by	   Lord	  Denning	   in	  
Bulmer	  v	  Bollinger:	  	  
“The	  Treaty	  is	  like	  an	  incoming	  tide.	   	  It	  flows	  into	  the	  estuaries	  and	  
up	  the	  rivers.	   	   It	  cannot	  be	  held	  back.	   	  Parliament	  has	  decreed	  that	  
the	  Treaty	  is	  henceforward	  to	  be	  part	  of	  our	  law.	  	  It	  is	  equal	  in	  force	  
to	  any	  statue.”18	  	  This	   view	   has	   been	   consistently	   upheld	   in	   the	   national	   courts,	   as	   recently	  evidenced	  by	  Mr	  Justice	  Vos	  in	  Littlewoods:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  A	   similar	   right	   is	   enshrined	   in	   s3	   HRA	   1998,	   and	   was	   used	   as	   the	   basis	   of	   a	   conforming	  interpretation	   in	   the	   leading	  human	  rights	  case,	  Ghaidan.	   	   In	   this	   case,	   the	  House	  of	  Lords	  was	  able	  to	  construe	  a	  reference	  which	  protected	  the	  rights	  of	  spouses	  under	  tenancy	  agreements	  to	  include	  same-­‐sex	  partners.	  18	  [1974]	  Ch	  401	  at	  418,	  as	  cited	  in	  Turpin	  &	  Tomkins,	  p.310	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“Section	  2	  of	   the	  European	  Communities	  Act	  1972	   requires	  English	  
legislation	  ‘to	  be	  construed	  and	  have	  effect	  subject	  to’	  EU	  rights.”19	  	  Furthermore,	   the	  Act,	   through	   s2(4),	   requires	   the	   domestic	   courts	   to	   interpret	  legislation,	  where	  possible,	  in	  such	  a	  way	  so	  as	  to	  be	  in	  accordance	  with	  EU	  law.	  	  Finally,	  s	  3(1)	  of	  the	  Act	  obliges	  the	  courts	  to	  consider	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  the	  ECJ	  when	  ruling	  on	  domestic	  points	  of	  law.	  	  	  	  
3.2. The	  question	  of	  competence	  	  As	  outlined	  above,	  s2(1)	  ECA	  1972	  provides	  for	  an	  adoption	  into	  domestic	  law	  of	  the	  rights	  and	  obligations	  under	  EU	  law	  as	  contained	  in	  the	  Treaty.	  	  The	  question	  is	   –	  what	   does	   this	  mean	   for	   concept	   of	   UK	   Parliamentary	   sovereignty	   and,	   of	  particular	   relevance	   in	   the	   context	   of	  Vodafone	  2,	   its	   competence	   in	   respect	   of	  direct	  tax	  affairs?	  	  member	  states	  of	  the	  EU	  (including	  the	  UK20)	  have	  transferred	  to	  the	  EU	  certain	  limited	  powers	  specified	  in	  Article	  5	  TEU,	  which	  states	  “the	  Community	  shall	  act	  
within	   the	   limits	   of	   the	   powers	   conferred	   upon	   it	   by	   this	   Treaty	   and	   of	   the	  
objectives	   assigned	   to	   it	   therein”21.	   	   Although	   the	   Treaty	   makes	   no	   explicit	  reference	  to	  direct	  taxes,	   it	   is	  clear	  from	  Humblet	  that	  power	  to	  tax	  Community	  officials’	   salaries	   resided	   with	   the	   EU	   alone22,	   and	   that	   this	   represented	   a	   full	  transfer	  of	  competence	  under	   the	  Treaty	   from	  member	  states	   to	   the	  EU,	  which	  first	   occurred	   (subject	   to	   the	   transitional	   arrangements	   put	   in	   place)	   upon	  establishment	  of	  the	  EEC	  by	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Rome	  in	  1958.	  	  	  	  Furthermore,	  repeated	  case	  law	  of	  the	  ECJ	  –	  starting	  famously	  with	  Avoir	  Fiscal	  in	  1986	  –	  dictates	  that	  whilst	  member	  states	  retain	  control	  over	  direct	  tax	  affairs,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Para.	  74,	  Littlewoods	  20	  Through	  its	  signing	  of	  the	  EEC	  Accession	  Agreement	  in	  1973	  21	  See	  O’Shea	  (competence),	  p.72	  for	  more	  details.	  22	  O’Shea	  (competence),	  p.72	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they	  do	  so	  under	  the	  requirement	  to	  comply	  with	  their	  obligations	  as	  laid	  down	  in	  the	  Treaty23.	  	  Many	  of	  such	  obligations	  are	  included	  in	  the	  area	  of	  shared	  competence	  between	  the	   EU	   and	   member	   states,	   as	   stipulated	   in	   Article	   4(2)	   TFEU.	   	   Shared	  competence	   is	   defined	   as	   an	   area	   in	   which	   member	   states	   cannot	   exercise	  competence	  or	  legislate	  where	  the	  EU	  has	  already	  done	  so24.	  	  Crucially,	   from	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   Vodafone	   2,	   one	   of	   the	   areas	   of	   shared	  competence	   is	   the	   internal	   market 25 ,	   which	   includes	   the	   freedom	   of	  establishment.	  	  Therefore,	  since	  the	  Treaty	  confers	  the	  freedom	  of	  establishment,	  this	  particular	  competence	  has	  been	  exercised	  by	  the	  EU	  and	  cannot	  be	  exercised	  by	   member	   states.	   	   The	   logical	   result	   of	   this	   is	   that	   s2(1)	   ECA	   1972	   gives	  immediate	  direct	   legal	  effect	   in	  the	  UK	  to	  the	  freedom	  of	  establishment,	  and	  all	  other	  freedoms	  which	  the	  ECJ	  has	  interpreted	  as	  having	  direct	  effect26.	  	  	  
3.3. ECJ	  jurisprudence	  and	  the	  supremacy	  of	  EU	  law	  	  If	  the	  domestic	  statute,	  through	  the	  ECA	  1972,	  requires	  the	  UK	  courts	  to	  consider	  the	   jurisprudence	  of	   the	  ECJ	  when	  assessing	  domestic	   law,	   then	  what	  does	   the	  ECJ	  say	  about	  the	  supremacy	  of	  EU	  law?	  	  	  
3.3.1. van	  Gend	  en	  Loos	  –	  an	  early	  assertion	  of	  supremacy	  	  The	  ECJ	   first	  articulated	   its	  doctrine	  of	   supremacy	   in	  van	  Gend	  en	  Loos.	   	   In	   this	  case,	  the	  appellant	  argued	  that	  the	  imposition	  of	  an	  increased	  import	  duty	  after	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  See	  para.	  24,	  Avoir	  Fiscal	  24	  Chalmers,	  Davies	  &	  Monti,	  p.208	  25	  Article	  4(2)a	  TFEU	  26	  See	  section	  3.4	  below	  for	  examples	  of	  the	  direct	  effect	  of	  the	  freedom	  of	  establishment.	  	  For	  an	  example	  of	  direct	  effect	  in	  freedom	  to	  provide	  services,	  see	  van	  Binsbergen	  and	  for	  an	  example	  of	  direct	  effect	  in	  free	  movement	  of	  capital	  see	  Sanz	  de	  Lera.	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the	  implementation	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty	  was	  contrary	  to	  Article	  12	  EC27.	  	  One	  of	  the	  questions	   put	   to	   the	   ECJ	  was	  whether	   or	   not	   this	   article	   had	   direct	   effect	   and	  could	   therefore	   be	   invoked	   by	   nationals	   of	   a	   member	   state.	   	   The	   Dutch	  government	  argued	  that	  the	  EC	  Treaty	  was	  the	  same	  as	  all	  international	  treaties	  and	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  direct	  effect	  would	  contradict	  the	  intentions	  of	  the	  Treaty	  drafters28.	  	  The	  ECJ	  disagreed	  with	  this	  submission,	  stating:	  	  
“The	  implementation	  of	  Article	  1229	  does	  not	  require	  any	  legislative	  
intervention	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   states.	   	   The	   fact	   that	   under	   this	  
Article	   it	   is	   the	   member	   states	   who	   are	   made	   the	   subject	   of	   the	  
negative	   obligation	   [not	   to	   impose	   import	   duties]	   does	   not	   imply	  
that	  their	  nationals	  cannot	  benefit	  from	  this	  obligation.”	  	  	  
3.3.2. Costa	  v	  ENEL	  –	  confirmation	  of	  the	  position	  	  This	   view	   was	   confirmed	   by	   the	   ECJ	   in	   Costa	   v	   ENEL.	   	   Costa	   was	   an	   Italian	  national	   and	   shareholder	   in	   Edison	  Volta;	   a	   company	  which	  was	   subsequently	  nationalised	   and	   renamed	   ENEL.	   	   Costa	   argued	   that	   the	   nationalisation	   of	   the	  company	   was	   contrary	   to	   the	   EU	   law	   on	   state	   distortion	   of	   the	   market.	   	   The	  Italian	   government	   countered	   that	   it	   was	   not	   within	   the	   jurisdiction	   of	   the	  national	  court	  to	  refer	  such	  a	  matter	  to	  the	  ECJ.	  	  The	  ECJ	  disagreed	  and,	  asserting	  its	  authority	  and	  the	  supremacy	  of	  EU	  law,	  ruled:	  	  
“The	  member	  states	  have	  limited	  their	  sovereign	  rights,	  albeit	  within	  
limited	  fields,	  and	  have	  thus	  created	  a	  body	  of	  law	  which	  binds	  both	  
nationals	  and	  themselves.”	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Now	  Article	  30	  TFEU	  28	  Craig	  &	  De	  Búrca,	  p.272	  29	  Now	  Article	  30	  TFEU	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3.3.3. Simmenthal	  –	  a	  forward	  looking	  view	  of	  supremacy	  	  The	  ECJ	  further	  applied	  and	  extended	  this	  doctrine	  of	  supremacy	  in	  Simmenthal.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  an	  Italian	  import	  duty	  –	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  public	  health	  inspection	  fee	  –	   introduced	   after	   the	   enactment	   of	   the	   EU	   Treaty,	   was	   challenged	   as	   a	  restriction	  on	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods.	   	  This	  was	  upheld	  by	  the	  ECJ	  but	  the	  Italian	  authorities	  then	  argued	  separately	  that,	  although	  the	  law	  introducing	  the	  fee	   had	   been	   after	   accession	   to	   the	   Community,	   it	   was	   for	   the	   Italian	  constitutional	  court	  to	  rule	  on	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  law,	  and	  not	  the	  ECJ30.	  	  The	   ECJ	   ruled	   that	   the	   existence	   of	   Community	   law	   rendered	   inapplicable	   any	  existing	   national	   law	   which	   contradicted	   it,	   and	   furthermore	   precluded	   the	  adoption	   of	   any	   new	   rule	   which	   was	   contrary	   to	   Community	   provisions31,	  stating:	  	  
“Every	   national	   court	  must,	   in	   a	   case	   within	   its	   jurisdiction,	   apply	  
Community	   law	   in	   its	   entirety	   and	   protect	   rights	   which	   the	   latter	  
confers	  on	  individuals	  and	  must	  accordingly	  set	  aside	  any	  provision	  
of	   national	   law	   which	   may	   conflict	   with	   it,	   whether	   prior	   or	  
subsequent	  to	  the	  Community	  rule.”	  	  	  
3.4. Freedom	  of	  establishment	  and	  the	  supremacy	  of	  EU	  law	  	  Supremacy	  of	  EU	  law	  and	  the	  principle	  of	  direct	  effect	  is	  also	  present	  in	  ECJ	  case	  law	   referring	   to	   the	   freedom	   of	   establishment;	   the	   freedom	   in	   question	   in	  
Vodafone	  2.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Turpin	  &	  Tomkins,	  p.306	  31	  Craig	  in	  Pernice	  &	  Miccù,	  p.35	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3.4.1. Reyners	  –	  an	  example	  of	  direct	  effect	  	  In	   this	   case,	   a	   Dutch	   national	   who	   was	   qualified	   to	   practise	   as	   an	   advocat	  (solicitor)	  in	  Belgium	  was	  prevented	  from	  doing	  so	  by	  a	  domestic	  rule	  in	  Belgium	  which	   contained	   a	   nationality	   clause,	   requiring	   all	   advocats	   in	   Belgium	   to	   be	  Belgian	  nationals.	   	  Reyners	   argued,	   and	   the	  ECJ	   ruled,	   that	   this	   restriction	  was	  contrary	  to	  the	  freedom	  of	  establishment,	  even	  where	  the	  European	  Council	  had	  not	   issued	   the	   Directives	   which	   were	   supposed	   to	   apply	   to	   the	   transitional	  period	  of	  introduction	  of	  freedom	  of	  establishment:	  	  
“In	   laying	  down	   that	   freedom	  of	  establishment	   shall	  be	  attained	  at	  
the	   end	   of	   the	   transitional	   period,	   Article	   5232	  thus	   imposes	   an	  
obligation	  to	  attain	  a	  precise	  result,	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  which	  had	  to	  be	  
made	  easier	  by,	  but	  not	  made	  dependent	  on,	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  
programme	  of	  progressive	  measures.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  this	  progression	  
has	  not	  been	  adhered	  to	  leaves	  the	  obligation	  itself	  intact	  beyond	  the	  
end	   of	   the	   period	   provided	   for	   its	   fulfilment…	   It	   is	   not	   possible	   to	  
invoke	  against	  such	  an	  effect	   the	   fact	   that	  the	  Council	  has	   failed	  to	  
issue	  the	  Directives	  provided	  for.”33	  	  The	  case	  is	  a	  good	  example	  of	  the	  ECJ	  developing	  the	  doctrine	  of	  direct	  effect	  in	  the	  area	  of	  freedom	  of	  establishment34	  which,	  of	  course,	  is	  especially	  relevant	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Vodafone	  2.	   	  It	  also	  establishes	  the	  precedent	  that	  it	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	   have	   a	   Directive	   in	   place	   in	   order	   to	   assert	   supremacy	   of	   the	   Treaty	  provisions.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Now	  Article	  49	  TFEU	  33	  Paras.	  26-­‐27	  &	  29,	  Reyners	  34	  Moens	  &	  Trone,	  p.370	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3.4.2. Filipiak	  –	  reinforcing	  the	  direct	  effect	  of	  freedom	  of	  establishment	  	  In	  Filipiak,	  the	  taxpayer	  –	  a	  Polish	  resident	  for	  tax	  purposes,	  carried	  on	  economic	  activity	   in	   the	   Netherlands	   as	   a	   partner	   in	   a	   Dutch	   partnership	   and	   paid	  mandatory	  social	  security	  and	  health	  insurance	  contributions	  in	  the	  Netherlands.	  	  As	  a	  Polish	  resident	  for	  tax	  purposes,	  the	  taxpayer	  was	  liable	  to	  Polish	  tax	  on	  his	  worldwide	   income,	   but	   sought	   to	   deduct	   the	   expenses	   incurred	   in	   the	  Netherlands	  on	  the	  insurance	  payments.	  	  	  	  This	   deduction	   was	   denied	   in	   Poland	   and	   the	   taxpayer	   appealed.	   	   Shortly	  thereafter,	   the	   Polish	   Constitutional	   Tribunal	   held	   that	   these	   particular	   rules	  regarding	   income	   tax	   were	   unconstitutional,	   but	   that	   the	   date	   on	   which	   they	  would	  lose	  their	  binding	  force	  should	  be	  delayed	  to	  a	  specified	  date	  in	  the	  future.	  	  The	   national	   court	   referred	   the	   case	   to	   the	   ECJ	   to	   determine	   the	   legislation’s	  compatibility	  with	  the	  freedom	  of	  establishment.	  	  What	  is,	  on	  the	  face	  of	  it,	  a	  fairly	  clear	  cut	  case	  of	  “less	  favourable	  treatment”	  was	  given	   additional	   significance	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   even	   though	   the	   Constitutional	  Tribunal	  had	  ruled	  the	  legislation	  to	  be	  unconstitutional	  and	  that	  it	  would	  lose	  its	  binding	   status,	   the	  ECJ	   held	   that	   its	   current	   existence	   contravened	  Community	  law	  and	  that	  the	  legislation	  must	  be	  disapplied	  with	  immediate	  effect:	  	  
“…	  the	  primacy	  of	  Community	  law	  obliges	  the	  national	  court	  to	  apply	  
Community	   law	  and	   to	   refuse	   to	  apply	   the	   conflicting	  provisions	  of	  
national	   law,	   irrespective	   of	   the	   judgment	   of	   the	   national	  
constitutional	   court	   which	   has	   deferred	   the	   date	   on	   which	   those	  
provisions,	   held	   to	   be	   unconstitutional,	   are	   to	   lose	   their	   binding	  
force.”35	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Para.	  85,	  Filipiak	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3.5. Freedom	   of	   establishment	   and	   the	   supremacy	   of	   EU	   law	   –	   some	  
observations	  	  These	   three	   freedom	   of	   establishment	   cases	   further	   reinforce	   the	   ECJ’s	  jurisprudence	   in	   the	   area	   of	   direct	   effect	   and	   confirm	   that	   the	   freedom	   of	  establishment	  is	  a	  directly	  applicable	  Treaty	  right.	  	  	  
4. ECJ	  jurisprudence	  and	  the	  principle	  of	  conforming	  interpretation	  	  It	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  jurisprudence	  examined	  above	  that	  the	  ECJ	  considers	  EU	  law	  to	  be	  supreme,	  and	  the	  freedom	  of	  establishment	  to	  be	  directly	  effective;	  both	  of	  which	   are	   important	   principles	   when	   examining	   how	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	  reached	  its	  judgment	  in	  Vodafone	  2.	  	  Equally	  important	  is	  the	  approach	  taken	  by	  the	  ECJ	  to	  domestic	  courts’	  requirement	  to	  interpret	  EU	  law	  which	  it	  regards	  as	  supreme	  and	  it	  is	  to	  this	  topic	  which	  the	  analysis	  will	  now	  turn.	  	  The	  ECJ	  leaves	  the	  responsibility	  of	  interpreting	  domestic	  law	  in	  light	  of	  EU	  law	  obligations	  to	  the	  national	  courts36,	  since	  the	  ECJ’s	  area	  of	  competence	  lies	  with	  the	   interpretation	   of	   EU	   law	  only37.	   	   It	   does,	   however,	   offer	   some	   guidance	   on	  how	  national	  courts	  should	  approach	   the	   issue.	   	  For	  example,	   in	  Scotch	  Whisky	  
Association,	  the	  Advocate	  General	  (“AG”)	  stated	  in	  his	  opinion	  that:	  	  
“it	  is	  a	  fundamental	  principle	  of	  statutory	  interpretation	  that	  words	  
which	  do	  not	  require	  interpretation,	  because	  they	  are	  perfectly	  clear,	  
should	  not	  be	  distorted	  under	  pretence	  of	  interpretation”38	  	  At	  first	  glance,	  this	  approach	  to	  conforming	  interpretation	  appears	  to	  tie	  in	  with	  that	   espoused	   in	   the	  UK	  domestic	   courts;	   the	  basis	  of	   interpretation	   should	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  See	  para.	  72	  of	  Cadbury	  Schweppes	  for	  –	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Vodafone	  2	  –	  one	  of	  the	  most	  relevant	  examples	  of	  this	  practice.	  37	  See	   para.	   20	   of	  Damseaux	   for	   an	   example	   of	   the	   ECJ’s	   jurisprudence	   on	   this	   issue.	   	   See	   also	  O’Shea	  (Damseaux)	  for	  a	  description	  of	  the	  facts	  and	  further	  analysis	  of	  the	  case.	  38	  Para.	  18	  of	  the	  AG’s	  opinion	  in	  Scotch	  Whisky	  Association	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the	  ordinary	  and	  natural	  meaning	  of	  the	  words,	  and	  interpretation	  should	  not	  be	  used	   as	   a	   method	   of	   materially	   altering	   the	   statue.	   	   However,	   the	   ECJ	   has	  developed	  a	  set	  of	  principles	  over	  and	  above	  this	  narrow	  definition	  of	  domestic	  courts’	  obligation	   to	   interpret	  national	   law	  according	   to	   the	   simple	  meaning	  of	  the	  words	  used.	  	  	  
4.1. Von	  Colson	  –	  laying	  the	  foundations	  of	  conforming	  interpretation	  	  In	   von	   Colson,	   the	   appellants	   were	   women	   who	   were	   respectively	   refused	  employment	   in	  a	  German	  male	  prison	  and	  a	  German	  company	  trading	   in	  Saudi	  Arabia	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	   their	  sex.	   	  The	  appellants	  claimed	  that	   this	   treatment	  was	  contrary	  to	  Council	  Directive	  (EEC)	  76/207,	  the	  Equal	  Treatment	  Directive.	  	  The	   ECJ	   ruled	   that	   the	   Directive	   in	   question	   was	   not	   sufficiently	   precise	   to	  guarantee	  a	  specific	  remedy,	  but	  the	  important	  part	  of	  the	  judgment	  –	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	   conforming	   interpretation	  –	  came	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  effect	   that	  the	  Directive’s	  aims	  may	  have	  on	  the	  interpretation	  of	  national	  law39.	  	  In	  respect	  of	  this,	  the	  ECJ	  ruled:	  	  
“In	  applying	   the	  national	   law	  and	   in	  particular	   the	  provisions	   of	   a	  
national	  law	  specifically	  introduced	  in	  order	  to	  implement	  Directive	  
No	  76/207,	  national	  courts	  are	  required	  to	   interpret	   their	  national	  
law	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  wording	  and	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  Directive.”40	  	  At	  first	  glance,	  such	  a	  statement	  seems	  to	  confirm	  that	  interpretation	  should	  be	  based	  on	  the	  ‘simple	  meaning	  of	  the	  words	  used’.	  	  However,	  the	  main	  difference	  is	   that	   it	   is	   the	   words	   and	   purpose	   of	   the	   piece	   of	   EU	   law	   (in	   this	   case,	   the	  Directive)	  which	  are	  key	  and	  not	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  national	  law.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Craig	  &	  De	  Búrca,	  p.287	  40	  Para.	  26,	  von	  Colson	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4.2. Marleasing	  –	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  conforming	  interpretation	  	  Whereas	   von	  Colson	   alluded	   to	   the	   requirement	   for	   national	   courts	   to	   apply	   a	  conforming	   interpretation	   more	   widely	   than	   just	   to	   Directives,	   the	   ECJ’s	  judgment	  in	  Marleasing	  made	  this	  explicit.	   	   In	  this	  case,	  the	  appellant	  sought	  in	  the	  Spanish	  Courts	  to	  have	  nullified	  the	  founders’	  contract	  which	  established	  the	  defendant’s	  company	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  contract	  was	  a	  sham.	  	  	  	  The	  ability	   to	  do	   this	  under	  Spanish	  domestic	   law	  was	  not	  mirrored	   in	  Council	  Directive	   (EEC)	  68/151	  which	   –	   in	  Article	  11	   –	   contained	   an	   exhaustive	   list	   of	  conditions	  under	  which	  a	  contract	  could	  be	  nullified.	  	  Since	  the	  Spanish	  law	  had	  existed	   prior	   to	   Spain’s	   accession	   to	   the	   (then)	   European	   Communities,	   and	  Spain	  had	  not	  transposed	  the	  Directive	  into	  its	  domestic	  code,	  the	  Spanish	  courts	  referred	   to	   the	   ECJ	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   or	   not	   domestic	   law	   in	   this	   area	  should	  be	  interpreted	  in	  line	  with	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  Directive.	  	  The	   ECJ	   held	   that	   the	   Spanish	   court	   was,	   to	   the	   extent	   possible,	   required	   to	  interpret	   national	   legislation	   in	   line	   with	   the	   wording	   and	   purpose	   of	   the	  Directive,	   even	  where	   such	   a	  Directive	   had	  not	   been	   transposed	   into	  domestic	  law,	   and	   the	   domestic	   legislation	   in	   question	   had	   existed	   prior	   to	   the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Directive:	  	  
“In	  applying	  national	   law,	  whether	   the	  provisions	   in	  question	  were	  
adopted	  before	  or	  after	  the	  Directive,	  the	  national	  court	  called	  upon	  
to	   interpret	   it	   is	  required	  to	  do	  so,	  as	   far	  as	  possible,	   in	  the	   light	  of	  
the	  wording	  and	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  Directive	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  the	  
result	  pursued	  by	  the	  latter.”41	  	  The	  ECJ	  went	   further,	   to	  suggest	  that	   in	  this	  particular	  case,	   the	  Spanish	  courts	  must	   interpret	   the	  domestic	   law	   so	   as	   to	   exclude	   the	  possibility	   of	   nullifying	   a	  contract	  which	  was	  a	  sham42:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Para.	  8,	  Marleasing	  42	  Amstutz,	  p.771	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“…	   a	   national	   court	   hearing	   a	   case	  which	   falls	  within	   the	   scope	   of	  
Directive	  68/151	  is	  required	  to	  interpret	  its	  national	  law	  in	  the	  light	  
of	  the	  wording	  and	  the	  purpose	  of	  that	  Directive	  in	  order	  to	  preclude	  
a	   declaration	   of	   nullity	   of	   a	   public	   limited	   company	   on	   a	   ground	  
other	  than	  those	  listed	  in	  Article	  11	  of	  the	  Directive.”43	  	  In	  so	  ruling,	  the	  ECJ	  widened	  the	  conforming	  interpretation	  doctrine	  espoused	  in	  
von	  Colson	  to	  include	  national	  legislation	  which	  had	  no	  specific	  connection	  with	  a	  Directive44.	  	  	  
4.3. Pfeiffer	  –	  further	  evidence	  of	  the	  conforming	  interpretation	  principle	  in	  EU	  
law	  	  	  The	   issue	   in	  Pfeiffer45	  was	  whether	  or	  not	   there	  had	  been	  a	  breach	  of	  Directive	  (EEC)	  93/104	  –	   the	  Working	  Time	  Directive,	  which	  stipulated	   that	   the	  average	  working	   time	   over	   7	   days	   should	   be	   no	   more	   than	   48	   hours.	   	   Central	   to	   the	  analysis	  was	  whether	   ‘duty	   time’	   should	  be	   taken	   into	   account.	   	   The	  ECJ	   ruled	  that	  it	  should46	  and	  as	  a	  result	  the	  average	  working	  time	  of	  the	  appellant	  was	  49	  hours.	   	  Since	  this	  was	   in	  excess	  of	   the	  48	  hours	  stipulated	  by	  the	  Directive,	   the	  ECJ	  was	  asked	  to	  rule	  on	  the	  direct	  effect	  of	  a	  Directive,	  where	  the	  Directive	  had	  not	  been	  correctly	  transposed	  into	  national	  law.	  	  The	  ECJ	  held:	  	  
“Although	   the	   principle	   that	   national	   law	   must	   be	   interpreted	   in	  
conformity	   with	   Community	   law	   concerns	   chiefly	   domestic	  
provisions	  enacted	  in	  order	  to	  implement	  the	  Directive	  in	  question,	  it	  
does	  not	  entail	  an	  interpretation	  merely	  of	  those	  provisions	  but	  
requires	  the	  national	  court	  to	  consider	  national	  law	  as	  a	  whole	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Para.	  13,	  Marleasing	  44	  Craig	  &	  De	  Búrca,	  p.289	  45	  See	  Sawyer	  for	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  facts	  in	  Pfeiffer.	  46	  See	  para.	  94,	  Pfeiffer	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in	   order	   to	   assess	   to	   what	   extent	   it	   may	   be	   applied	   so	   as	   not	   to	  
produce	  a	  result	  contrary	  to	  that	  sought	  by	  the	  Directive.”47	  
	  It	  went	  on	  to	  rule:	  
	  
“In	   that	   context,	   if	   the	   application	   of	   interpretative	   methods	  
recognised	   by	   national	   law	   enables,	   in	   certain	   circumstances,	   a	  
provision	  of	  domestic	  law	  to	  be	  construed	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  avoid	  
conflict	   with	   another	   rule	   of	   domestic	   law	   or	   the	   scope	   of	   that	  
provision	  to	  be	  restricted	  to	  that	  end	  by	  applying	  it	  only	  in	  so	  far	  as	  
it	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  rule	  concerned,	  the	  national	  court	  is	  bound	  
to	   use	   those	  methods	   in	   order	   to	   achieve	   the	   result	   sought	   by	   the	  
Directive.”48	  	  
Pfeiffer	   is	   an	   example	   of	   the	   continuing	   principle	   of	   conforming	   interpretation	  seen	  in	  von	  Colson	  and	  Marleasing.	  	  However,	  perhaps	  more	  interesting	  is	  the	  fact	  that	   it	   extends	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   conforming	   interpretation	   to	   require	   national	  courts	   to	   consider	   all	   national	   law	   when	   attempting	   to	   reach	   a	   conforming	  interpretation.	   	   Furthermore,	   it	   requires	   national	   courts	   to	   use	   recognised	  domestic	  methods	  of	   interpretation	   to	  construe	   laws	   in	  such	  a	  way	  as	   to	  avoid	  conflict	  with	  EU	   law.	   	  This	   is	  of	  particular	  relevance	   to	   the	   issue	  of	  conforming	  interpretation,	  as	  addressed	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  in	  Vodafone	  2,	  and	  raises	  an	  interesting	   question	   of	   how	  EU	   law	   could	   be	   interpreted	  differently	   in	   various	  member	  states	  as	  a	  result	  of	  differing	  domestic	  methods	  of	  interpretation.	  	  
4.4. The	   limits	   of	   conforming	   interpretation:	   contra-­‐legem	   application	   of	   EU	  
law	  
	  It	   is	   clear	   from	   the	   jurisprudence	   of	   the	   ECJ	   that	   national	   courts	   are	   under	   an	  obligation	  to	  interpret	  domestic	  law	  –	  to	  the	  extent	  possible	  –	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	   obligations	   placed	   upon	  member	   states	   by	   the	  Treaties.	   	  However,	   the	   ECJ	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Para.	  115,	  Pfeiffer	  (author’s	  emphasis)	  48	  Para.	  116,	  Pfeiffer	  (author’s	  emphasis)	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has	  ruled	  on	  several	  occasions	  that	  where	  such	  an	  interpretation	  is	  not	  possible	  under	  domestic	  law,	  the	  national	  courts	  are	  not	  required	  to	  take	  a	  contra-­legem	  position.	  
	  In	   Wagner	   Miret	   the	   ECJ	   ruled49	  that	   the	   national	   provisions	   could	   not	   be	  interpreted	  in	  a	  manner	  which	  would	  conform	  to	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  relevant	  Directive	  and,	  as	   such,	   the	  Member	  State	  would	  be	   required	   to	  make	  good	  any	  losses	  suffered	  under	  the	  Francovich	  principle.	  	  This	  view	  was	  echoed	  in	  Evobus	  
Austria;	   a	   case	   in	   which	   a	   Directive50	  which	   had	   not	   been	   transposed	   into	  national	   law	   and	   the	   existing	   domestic	   law	   could	   not	   be	   interpreted	   in	   such	   a	  way	  so	  as	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  Directive,	  since	  certain	  provisions	  of	  the	  domestic	  law	  were	   in	   direct	   contradiction	   to	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	   Directive.	   	   A	   further	  example	  of	  this	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Adeneler,	  where	  the	  ECJ	  held	  that	  the	  application	  of	  conforming	  interpretation	  should	  not	  be	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  legal	  certainty	  and	  non-­‐retroactivity:	  
	  
“It	   is	   true	   that	   the	   obligation	   on	   a	   national	   court	   to	   refer	   to	   the	  
content	  of	  a	  Directive	  when	   interpreting	  and	  applying	   the	   relevant	  
rules	   of	   domestic	   law	   is	   limited	   by	   general	   principles	   of	   law,	  
particularly	  those	  of	   legal	  certainty	  and	  non-­retroactivity,	  and	  that	  
obligation	  cannot	  serve	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  an	  interpretation	  of	  national	  
law	  contra	  legem.”51	  	  	  
4.5. EU	  principles	  of	  conforming	  interpretation	  –	  some	  observations	  	  The	   body	   of	   existing	   and	   continuing	   case	   law	   from	   the	   ECJ	   in	   the	   area	   of	  conforming	   interpretation	   represents	   a	   consistent	   theme	   to	   the	   ECJ’s	  jurisprudence	   in	   this	  area.	   	  From	  the	  examples	  outlined	  above,	   it	   is	  possible	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  See	  para.	  22,	  Wagner	  Miret	  50 	  Council	   Directive	   (EEC)	   92/13	   coordinating	   the	   laws,	   regulations	   and	   administrative	  provisions	   relating	   to	   the	   application	   of	   Community	   rules	   on	   the	   procurement	   procedures	   of	  entities	  operating	  in	  the	  water,	  energy,	  transport	  and	  telecommunications	  sectors.	  51	  Para.	  110,	  Adeneler	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distil	   a	   set	   of	   principles	   which	   the	   ECJ	   applies	   to	   cases	   where	   questions	   of	  conforming	  interpretation	  arise:	  	   a) EU	  law	  is	  supreme:	  	  it	  is	  clear	  from	  van	  Gend	  en	  Loos	  and	  Costa	  v	  ENEL	  that	  where	  an	  existing	  national	  law	  is	  found	  to	  be	  incompatible	  with	  EU	  law,	  it	  is	   EU	   law	   which	   prevails.	   	   This	   concept	   was	   further	   advanced	   in	  
Simmenthal,	   where	   the	   principle	   was	   applied	   to	   any	   national	   law	  introduced	  after	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  relevant	  EU	  law;	  	  b) Supremacy	   applies	   to	   all	   Treaty	   freedoms:	   although	   a	   large	   body	   of	   the	  case	  law	  in	  the	  area	  of	  supremacy	  is	  focused	  on	  the	  interaction	  between	  national	  law	  and	  EU	  Directives,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  all	  directly	  effective	  Treaty	  obligations	   and	   freedoms	   rank	   above	   any	   contradictory	   domestic	   law	  provisions.	   	  This	  principle	   is	  confirmed	   in	  Filipiak,	  but	  had	  already	  been	  seen	  previously	  in	  Überseering	  and	  SEVIC;	  	   c) National	  courts	  are	  obliged	  to	  adopt	  a	  conforming	  interpretation:	  the	  ECJ	  is	  clear	   that	   national	   courts	   are	   required	   –	   where	   possible	   -­‐	   to	   reach	   a	  conforming	   interpretation	   of	   EU	   law.	   	   The	   principle	   has	   been	   expanded	  over	   the	   years,	   starting	   with	   interpretation	   of	   Directives	   in	   von	   Colson,	  being	  widened	  to	  include	  national	  law	  which	  was	  not	  specifically	  enacted	  for	   the	   purposes	   of	   implementing	   a	   Directive	   in	  Marleasing,	   and	   then	  expanding	   to	   include	   a	   requirement	   to	   use	   domestic	   methods	   of	  interpretation	  of	  all	  national	  law	  in	  Pfeiffer;	  and	  	   d) The	  obligation	  does	  not	  extend	  to	  contra	  legem	  interpretations:	  whilst	   the	  requirement	  to	  reach	  a	  conforming	  interpretation	  is	  well	  established	  and	  consistently	  stated	  in	  ECJ	  jurisprudence,	  it	  does	  not	  oblige	  national	  courts	  to	  adopt	  a	  contra	  legem	   interpretation	  of	  national	   law	  where	  it	  simply	  is	  not	  possible	   to	   interpret	   the	  provisions	  of	   the	   relevant	  piece	  of	  EU	   law.	  	  However,	  in	  this	  scenario,	  member	  states	  may	  suffer	  a	  liability	  under	  the	  
Francovich	  principle.	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5. The	  UK	  domestic	  view	  of	  EU	  law	  supremacy	  	  The	  ECJ	  jurisprudence	  as	  outlined	  above	  provides	  a	  basis	  for	  the	  principle	  of	  EU	  law	   supremacy	   and	   conforming	   interpretation.	   	  However,	   before	   analysing	   the	  specific	  details	  of	  Vodafone	  2,	  it	  is	  beneficial	  to	  examine	  how	  the	  domestic	  courts	  in	  the	  UK52	  have	  addressed	  these	  particular	  issues.	  	  	  
5.1. Supremacy	  of	  EU	  law	  and	  UK	  domestic	  jurisprudence	  	  As	  outlined	  above53,	   the	  UK	  courts	  quickly	  realised	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  ECA	  1972	  and	  the	  responsibilities	  that	  accession	  to	  the	  EEC	  brought.	  	  Accordingly,	  there	  is	  a	   body	   of	   case	   law	   in	   which	   the	   UK	   courts	   have	   affirmed	   the	   principle	   of	  supremacy	  of	  EU	  law.	  	  	  
5.1.1. Macarthys	  Ltd	  v	  Smith	  –	  an	  early	  ruling	  on	  EU	  law	  supremacy	  	  One	  of	   the	  early	   landmark	  cases	  which	  established	  the	  supremacy	  of	  EU	  law	  in	  the	   UK	   (but	   also	   addressed	   the	   concepts	   of	   conforming	   interpretation)	   was	  
Macarthys	   Ltd	   v	   Smith54.	   	   In	   this	   case,	   an	   employer	   replaced	   its	   stockroom	  manager	  –	  a	  male	  employee	  –	  with	  a	  female	  employee,	  but	  at	  a	  lower	  rate	  of	  pay.	  	  An	   industrial	   tribunal	  held	   that	   the	   female	  employee	  was	  entitled	  to	  be	  paid	  at	  the	   same	   rate	   as	   the	   previous	  male	   employee.	   	   The	   employer	   appealed	   on	   the	  basis	   that	   for	   the	  Equal	  Pay	  Act	  1970	  to	  apply,	   the	  male	  and	  female	  employees	  must	  be	  employed	  by	  the	  same	  employer	  on	  like	  work	  at	  the	  same	  time.	   	   In	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  The	  analysis	   in	   this	  paper	   is	   focused	  on	   the	   law	  of	  England	  and	  Wales,	  but	   “UK”	   is	  used	   in	  a	  more	  generic	  sense.	  53	  See	  section	  3.1.	  54	  See	   Turpin	   &	   Tomkins,	   pp.322-­‐327	   for	   a	   summary	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   case	   and	   the	  subsequent	  ECJ	  and	  House	  of	  Lords	  rulings	  in	  the	  case	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view	  of	   the	  employer,	   since	   the	   female	  employee	  was	  employed	  after	   the	  male	  employee,	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  Equal	  Pay	  Act	  1970	  could	  not	  apply.	  	  Lord	  Denning	  began	  his	  analysis	  with	  Article	  119	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty55	  (the	  Article	  requiring	  equal	  pay	  for	  men	  and	  women),	  since	  in	  his	  view	  it	  “takes	  priority	  even	  
over	  our	  own	  statute”56.	   	   He	   confirmed	   that	   the	   EC	  Treaty	   and	  Article	   119	   had	  direct	  effect	  in	  the	  UK,	  stating:	  	  
“Article	  119	  of	  the	  EEC	  Treaty	  says:	  
	  
'Each	   Member	   State	   shall	   during	   the	   first	   stage	   ensure	   and	  
subsequently	  maintain	  the	  application	  of	  the	  principle	  that	  men	  
and	  women	  should	  receive	  equal	  pay	  for	  equal	  work	  …	  '	  
	  
That	  principle	   is	  part	  of	  our	  English	   law.	   It	   is	  directly	  applicable	   in	  
England.	  	  So	  much	  so	  that,	  even	  if	  we	  had	  not	  passed	  any	  legislation	  
on	  the	  point,	  our	  courts	  would	  have	  been	  bound	  to	  give	  effect	  to	  art	  
119.”57	  	  Furthermore,	  Lord	  Denning	  made	  reference	   to	   the	  binding	  nature	  of	  EU	   law	  as	  per	  the	  ECA	  1972:	  	  
“Under	   s	   2(1)	   and	   (4)	   of	   the	   European	   Communities	   Act	   1972	   the	  
principles	  laid	  down	  in	  the	  Treaty	  are	  'without	  further	  enactment'	  to	  
be	  given	   legal	  effect	   in	   the	  United	  Kingdom;	  and	  have	  priority	  over	  
'any	  enactment	  passed	  or	  to	  be	  passed'	  by	  our	  Parliament.	  	  So	  we	  are	  
entitled	   and	   I	   think	   bound	   to	   look	   at	   art	   119	   of	   the	   EEC	   Treaty	  
because	  it	  is	  directly	  applicable	  here.”58	  	  Having	   established	   that	   the	   EC	   Treaty	   had	   direct	   effect,	   Lord	   Denning	   then	  analysed	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   implementing	   legislation	   in	   the	   UK	   (namely,	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Now	  Article	  157	  TFEU.	  56	  [1979]	  3	  All	  ER	  325	  at	  328	  57	  ibid.	  58	  supra.,	  fn.	  56	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Equal	  Pay	  Act	  1970)	  could	  be	  construed	  so	  as	  to	  cover	  a	  situation	  where	  a	  female	  employee	  was	  subsequently	  employed	  at	  a	  lower	  rate	  pay	  than	  a	  male	  employee,	  rather	   than	   only	   covering	   a	   situation	   where	   the	   employment	   was	  contemporaneous.	  	  He	  ruled:	  	  
“Article	   119	   is	   framed	   in	   European	   fashion.	   It	   enunciates	   a	   broad	  
general	   principle	   and	   leaves	   the	   judges	   to	  work	   out	   the	   details.	   In	  
contrast	  the	  Equal	  Pay	  Act	  is	  framed	  in	  English	  fashion.	  	  It	  states	  no	  
general	  principle	  but	  lays	  down	  detailed	  specific	  rules	  for	  the	  courts	  
to	  apply	  (which,	  so	  some	  hold,	  the	  courts	  must	  interpret	  according	  to	  
the	  actual	  language	  used)	  without	  resort	  to	  considerations	  of	  policy	  
or	  principle.”59	  	  Going	  on	  to	  state:	  	  
“In	  my	  opinion	  therefore	  art	  119	  is	  reasonably	  clear	  on	  the	  point;	  it	  
applies	  not	  only	  to	  cases	  where	  the	  woman	  is	  employed	  on	  like	  work	  
at	  the	  same	  time	  with	  a	  man	  in	  the	  same	  employment,	  but	  also	  when	  
she	  is	  employed	  on	  like	  work	  in	  succession	  to	  a	  man,	  that	  is,	  in	  such	  
close	  succession	  that	  it	  is	  just	  and	  reasonable	  to	  make	  a	  comparison	  
between	  them.”60	  	  Finally,	   Lord	   Denning	   analysed	   the	   impact	   of	   Article	   119	   on	   the	   domestic	  legislation	  and	  concluded:	  	  
Now	  stand	  back	  and	  look	  at	  the	  statutes	  as	  a	  single	  code	  intended	  to	  
eliminate	   discrimination	   against	   women.	   They	   should	   be	   a	  
harmonious	  whole.	  To	  achieve	  this	  harmony	  s1(2)(a)(i)	  of	  the	  Equal	  
Pay	  Act	   should	  not	  be	  read	  as	   if	   it	   included	  the	  words	   'at	   the	  same	  
time'.	   	   It	   should	   be	   interpreted	   so	   as	   to	   apply	   to	   cases	   where	   a	  
woman	   is	   employed	   at	   the	   same	   job	   doing	   the	   same	   work	   'in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  [1979]	  3	  All	  ER	  325	  at	  329	  60	  ibid.	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succession'	   to	  a	  man.	   	  By	  so	  construing	  the	  Treaty	  and	  the	  statutes	  
together	  we	  reach	  this	  very	  desirable	  result:	  it	  means	  that	  there	  is	  no	  
conflict	  between	  art	  119	  of	   the	  Treaty	  and	   s	  1(2)	  of	   the	  Equal	  Pay	  
Act;	  and	  that	  this	  country	  will	  have	  fulfilled	  its	  obligations	  under	  the	  
Treaty.	  	  This	  view	  of	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  domestic	  statue	  was	  not	  shared	  by	  Lawton	  LJ,	  who	  fell	  back	  on	  a	  more	  traditional	  interpretation	  of	  the	  relevant	  sections	  of	  the	  Equal	  Pay	  Act:	  	  
“In	  my	  judgment	  the	  grammatical	  construction	  of	  s	  1(2)	  is	  consistent	  
only	  with	  a	   comparison	  between	  a	  woman	  and	  a	  man	   in	   the	   same	  
employment	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  	  The	  words,	  by	  the	  tenses	  used,	  look	  to	  
the	  present	  and	  the	  future	  but	  not	  to	  the	  past.	  	  They	  are	  inconsistent	  
with	  a	   comparison	  between	  a	  woman	  and	  a	  man,	  no	   longer	   in	   the	  
same	  employment,	  who	  was	  doing	  her	  job	  before	  she	  got	  it.”61	  	  Despite	  this	  difference	  of	  opinion	  over	  how	  the	  legislation	  should	  be	  interpreted,	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  ruled	  that	  there	  was	  sufficient	  ambiguity	  so	  as	  to	  warrant	  a	  referral	  of	  the	  case	  to	  the	  ECJ,	  which	  duly	  ruled	  that	  Article	  119	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty	  was	  not	  confined	  to	  contemporaneous	  employment62.	  	  Aside	  from	  its	  acceptance	  of	  the	  supremacy	  of	  EU	  law,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  aspects	  of	  this	  judgment	  is	  the	  approach	  that	  the	  court	  took	  to	  interpretation	  of	  the	   domestic	   statute.	   	   Lawton	   LJ	   (and	   Cumming-­‐Bruce	   LJ)	   both	   adopted	   the	  traditional	   view	  of	   interpretation	  which	   focused	   on	   the	   ‘meaning	   of	   the	  words	  used’.	   	   Lord	   Denning	   can	   perhaps	   be	   seen	   in	   this	   context	   as	   somewhat	   of	   a	  visionary,	   since	   he	  was	   prepared	   as	   early	   as	   197963	  to	   take	   a	  more	   purposive	  approach	  to	   interpreting	  the	   legislation	  –	  a	  principle	  which	  was	  cited	  as	  one	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  [1979]	  3	  All	  ER	  325	  at	  332	  62	  See	  para.	  16	  of	  case	  C-­‐129/79	  Macarthys	  Ltd	  v	  Smith,	  cited	  at	  [1981]	  1	  All	  ER	  111	  at	  119	  63	  There	  are	  earlier	  examples	  of	  domestic	   jurisprudence	  which	   involved	   the	  EC	  Treaty	   (see	  R	  v	  
Secchi,	  Felixstowe	  Dock	  and,	  of	  course,	  Bulmer	  v	  Bollinger),	  but	  Macarthys	  Ltd	  v	  Smith	  is	  one	  of	  the	  first	   EU	   law	   cases	   to	   consider	   the	   requirement	   to	   construe	   the	   language	   of	   the	   statute	   in	   a	  different	  manner	  to	  traditional	  domestic	  principles	  of	  statutory	  interpretation.	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the	  central	  principles	  of	  conforming	   interpretation	   in	  Vodafone	  2	  (EWCA)	   some	  30	  years	  later.	  	  
5.1.2. Factortame	  (No.	  2)	  –	  confirmation	  of	  EU	  law	  supremacy	  	  Supremacy	  of	  EU	  law	  in	  the	  UK	  was	  reaffirmed	  in	  Factortame	  (No.	  2).	   	  This	  case	  was	   concerned	   with	   prohibition	   of	   Spanish	   owned	   vessels	   from	   fishing	   in	   UK	  waters.	   	   The	   first	   Factortame	   case 64 	  was	   focused	   on	   whether	   or	   not	   the	  appellants	   were	   entitled	   to	   interim	   relief	   in	   order	   to	   protect	   their	   financial	  interests;	   the	  absence	  of	  which	   the	  ECJ	   ruled	  was	  contrary	   to	  EU	   law65.	   	   In	   the	  subsequent	  ruling	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Lords,	  Lord	  Bridge	  stated:	  	  
“Whatever	  limitation	  of	  its	  sovereignty	  Parliament	  accepted	  when	  it	  
enacted	  the	  European	  Communities	  Act	  1972	  was	  entirely	  voluntary. 
Under	   the	   terms	  of	   the	  Act	  of	  1972	   it	  has	  always	  been	  clear	   that	   it	  
was	   the	   duty	   of	   a	   United	   Kingdom	   court,	   when	   delivering	   final	  
judgment,	  to	  override	  any	  rule	  of	  national	  law	  found	  to	  be	  in	  conflict	  
with	  any	  directly	  enforceable	  rule	  of	  Community	  law.”66	  	  This	  judgment	  from	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  establishes	  the	  supremacy	  of	  EU	  law	  in	  the	   jurisprudence	  of	   the	  UK	  domestic	   courts.	   	   Importantly,	   it	   also	   refers	   to	   the	  fact	  that	  any	  national	  law	  which	  is	  found	  to	  be	  in	  conflict	  with	  directly	  effective	  EU	  law	  should	  overridden.	   	  As	  explained	  above67,	  the	  freedom	  of	  establishment	  (along	   with	   the	   other	   fundamental	   freedoms)	   has	   been	   ruled	   by	   the	   ECJ	   as	   a	  directly	   effective	   EU	   law.	   	   As	   such,	   the	   UK	   courts	   have	   confirmed	   that	   the	  principle	   of	   freedom	   of	   establishment	   has	   direct	   effect,	   which	   is	   especially	  relevant	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Vodafone	  2.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  Factortame	  Ltd	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Transport	  [1990]	  2	  AC	  85	  65	  R.	   v	  Secretary	  of	   State	   for	   transport,	   ex	  p.	  Factortame	  Ltd	  and	  others	  C-­‐213/89	   [1990]	   ECR	   I-­‐2433	  66	  [1991]	  1	  AC	  603	  at	  658	  67	  See	  section	  3.4.2.	  
Candidate	  number:	  R6604	  
	   28	  
This	   contrasts	   with	   the	   view	   of	   some	   commentators68	  that	   the	   UK	   Parliament	  retains	  is	  sovereignty	  over	  international	  law,	  and	  therefore	  EU	  law,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  judgment	  in	  Cheney	  v	  Conn.	  	  In	  this	  case	  the	  taxpayer,	  Cheney,	  refused	  to	  pay	  a	   portion	   of	   his	   income	   tax	   after	   the	   1964	   Finance	   Act	   was	   passed,	   as	   he	  considered	   that	   this	   Act	  was	   in	   breach	   of	   the	  UK’s	   obligations	   not	   to	   fund	   the	  construction	   of	   nuclear	   weapons	   under	   the	   international	   law-­‐based	   Geneva	  Convention,	  as	  enacted	  in	  the	  UK	  through	  the	  Geneva	  Conventions	  Act	  1957.	  	  In	  dismissing	  the	  appeal,	  Ungoed-­‐Thomas	  J	  ruled:	  	  
“What	  the	  statute	  itself	  enacts	  cannot	  be	  unlawful,	  because	  what	  the	  
statute	   says	   and	   provides	   is	   itself	   the	   law,	   and	   the	   highest	   form	   of	  
law	  that	   is	  known	  to	   this	  country.	   It	   is	   the	   law	  which	  prevails	  over	  
every	   other	   form	   of	   law,	   and	   it	   is	   not	   for	   the	   court	   to	   say	   that	   a	  
parliamentary	   enactment,	   the	   highest	   law	   in	   this	   country,	   is	  
illegal.”69	  	  	  
5.2. The	  UK	  domestic	  view	  of	  EU	  law	  supremacy	  –	  some	  observations	  	  It	  may	  be	  true	  that	  Parliament	  retains	  the	  right	  to	  enact	  into	  statue	  any	  law	  it	  so	  chooses,	   regardless	   of	  whether	   or	   not	   it	  would	   be	   contradictory	   to	   obligations	  under	   international	   or	  EU	   law.	   	  However,	   in	   the	   context	   of	  EU	   law,	   this	   line	  of	  reasoning	   does	   not	   adequately	   consider	   the	   fact	   that	   Parliament	   has	   already	  codified	   its	  wish	   to	   operate	  within	   its	   obligations	   as	   defined	   in	   the	   EU	   Treaty	  through	  its	  acceptance	   into	   law	  of	   the	  ECA	  1972.	   	  Therefore,	  until	  such	  time	  as	  Parliament	  expresses	  a	  clear	  desire	   to	  no	   longer	  be	  subject	   to	  such	  constraints	  (through,	   for	   example,	   a	   repeal	   of	   the	   ECA	   1972),	   it	   must	   consider	   itself	   duty	  bound	  to	  legislate	  within	  the	  boundaries	  of	  its	  obligations	  under	  EU	  law.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  See,	  for	  example,	  Bradley	  &	  Ewing,	  p.59	  69	  [1968]	  1	  All	  ER	  779	  at	  782	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6. Conforming	  interpretation	  of	  the	  UK	  tax	  code	  in	  the	  context	  of	  EU	  law	  	  It	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  case	  law	  of	  both	  the	  ECJ	  and	  the	  domestic	  courts	  that	  EU	  law	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  supreme.	   	  With	  this	   in	  mind,	  the	  analysis	  will	  now	  focus	  on	  how	  such	  principles	  have	  been	  applied	   to	   case	   law	   in	   the	   field	  of	  UK	   tax.	   	   The	  inclusion	   at	   this	   stage	   of	   indirect	   tax	   jurisprudence	   is	   a	   deliberate	   one,	   since	  matters	   of	   conforming	   interpretation	   in	   the	   field	   of	   direct	   tax	   are	   necessarily	  shaped	   and	   moulded	   by	   other	   examples	   of	   conforming	   interpretation	   in	   the	  related	  field	  of	  indirect	  tax.	  	  	  	  Taking	   into	   account	   Lord	   Bridge’s	   comments	   in	   Factortame	   (No.	   2)	   where	   he	  declared	  that	  EU	  law	  should	  override	  incompatible	  domestic	   law,	  the	  focus	  will	  now	   turn	   to	   an	   examination	   of	   domestic	   tax	   law	   jurisprudence	   in	   which	   this	  approach	  has	  been	  adopted.	  	  The	  first	  example	  to	  be	  discussed	  is	  ICI	  v	  Colmer.	  	  	  
6.1. ICI	  v	  Colmer	  –	  conforming	  interpretation	  or	  disapplication?	  	  
ICI	  v	  Colmer	   centred	  on	  the	  availability	  of	  consortium	  relief	   in	   the	  UK.	   	   ICI	  held	  49%	  of	   the	  shares	   in	  a	  company,	  and	   its	  claim	   for	  consortium	  relief	  could	  only	  succeed	   if	   this	   company	   was	   considered	   to	   be	   a	   holding	   company	   under	   the	  relevant	   UK	   tax	   legislation70.	   	   Furthermore,	   the	   definition	   of	   company	   in	   the	  legislation	  was	  restricted	  to	  companies	  resident	  in	  the	  UK.	   	  In	  the	  present	  case,	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  23	  subsidiary	  companies	  were	  resident	  outside	  the	  UK	  and	  as	  a	  result	  HMRC	  initially	  denied	  the	  consortium	  relief.	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  s258(5)(b)	   of	   the	   Income	   and	   Corporation	   Taxes	   Act	   1970,	   as	   updated	   by	   s413(3)(b)	   ICTA	  1988.	   	  S27,	  sch	  1,	  para	  5	  of	  Finance	  Act	  2006	  ultimately	  inserted	  a	  definition	  of	  “EEA	  territory”	  with	  effect	  from	  19	  July	  2006.	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6.1.1. Early	  rulings	  on	  the	  case	  	  This	  view	  was	  upheld	  by	  the	  Special	  Commissioners,	  although	  overturned	  in	  the	  High	  Court	  where	  the	  judge	  held	  that	  the	  residence	  requirements	  did	  not	  apply.	  	  This	  was	  upheld	  in	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  and	  the	  case	  found	  its	  way	  to	  the	  House	  of	   Lords	   for	   the	   first	   time.	   	   The	  House	  of	   Lords	   took	   an	  opposing	   view	   to	   that	  held	  by	   the	  High	  Court	  and	   the	  Court	  of	  Appeal,	  but	   in	   so	  doing	   it	   requested	  a	  ruling	  from	  the	  ECJ	  on	  the	  compatibility	  of	  the	  residence	  requirement	  contained	  in	  the	  consortium	  relief	  legislation,	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  EU	  resident	  subsidiaries	  and	  the	  corresponding	  freedom	  of	  establishment	  under	  Article	  5271.	  	  	  
6.1.2. ICI	  v	  Colmer	  in	  the	  ECJ	  	  The	  ECJ	  conducted	  a	  fairly	  straightforward	  restriction	  analysis	  in	  this	  case,	  ruling	  that	   a	   restriction	   of	   consortium	   relief	   where	   all	   or	   the	   majority	   of	   eligible	  subsidiary	  companies	  must	  be	  resident	  in	  the	  same	  member	  state	  as	  the	  holding	  company	  would	  be	  contrary	  to	  the	  freedom	  of	  establishment:	  	  
“Art	   5272	  of	   the	   Treaty	   precludes	   legislation	   of	   a	   member	   state	  
which,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  companies	  established	  in	  that	  state	  belonging	  to	  
a	   consortium	   through	   which	   they	   control	   a	   holding	   company,	   by	  
means	  of	  which	  they	  exercise	  their	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  establishment	  
in	   order	   to	   set	   up	   subsidiaries	   in	   other	   member	   states,	   makes	   a	  
particular	   form	   of	   tax	   relief	   subject	   to	   the	   requirement	   that	   the	  
holding	  company's	  business	  consist	  wholly	  or	  mainly	   in	   the	  holding	  
of	   shares	   in	   subsidiaries	   that	   are	   established	   in	   the	   member	   state	  
concerned.”73	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  Now	  Article	  49	  TFEU.	  72	  Now	  Article	  49	  TFEU.	  73	  Para.	  30	  of	  the	  ECJ’s	  judgment	  in	  ICI	  v	  Colmer	  C-­‐264/96	  [1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐4695	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However,	  in	  the	  case	  at	  hand,	  since	  only	  6	  of	  the	  subsidiaries	  were	  resident	  in	  EU	  member	  states	  and	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  subsidiaries	  were	  based	  outside	  of	  the	  EU,	  the	  ECJ	  did	  not	  see	  the	  facts	  of	  this	  case	  as	  being	  affected	  by	  EU	  law74.	  	  Therefore,	  it	  was	  left	  to	  the	  national	  courts	  to	  decide	  how	  to	  address	  a	  situation	  where	  the	  same	   law	   could	   conceivably	  be	   contrary	   to	  EU	   law	   in	   some	   circumstances,	   but	  fall	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  treaty	  obligations	  in	  others:	  	  
“Where	   a	   particular	   provision	   must	   be	   disapplied	   in	   a	   situation	  
covered	   by	   Community	   law,	   but	   that	   same	   provision	   could	   remain	  
applicable	  to	  a	  situation	  not	  so	  covered,	  it	  is	  for	  the	  competent	  body	  
of	  the	  state	  concerned	  to	  remove	  that	  legal	  uncertainty	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  
might	  affect	  rights	  deriving	  from	  Community	  rules.”75	  	  In	  essence,	  the	  ECJ	  was	  advocating	  a	  principle	  of	  “limited	  disapplication”76	  of	  the	  consortium	   relief	   rules	   in	   circumstances	  where	   they	   restricted	   the	   freedom	   of	  establishment	   of	   companies	   seeking	   to	   incorporate	   subsidiary	   companies	   in	  other	  member	  states.	  	  	  
6.1.3. ICI	  v	  Colmer’s	  return	  to	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  	  On	   its	  second	  hearing	  before	   the	  House	  of	  Lords,	   the	  key	   issue	   in	   the	  case	  was	  how	  to	  interpret	  the	  ECJ’s	  ruling.	   	  The	  first	  option	  was	  that	  in	  order	  to	  conform	  with	   the	   ECJ	   ruling,	   the	   UK	   legislation	   should	   be	   read	   as	   if	   there	   were	   no	  restriction	   on	   residence	   in	   the	   consortium	   relief	   rules.	   	   The	   counter	   argument	  was	  to	  disapply	  the	  residence	  requirement	  in	  cases	  which	  fell	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	   ECJ’s	   judgment	   (i.e.	   where	   all	   or	   the	  majority	   of	   the	   subsidiaries	  were	   EU	  resident	  companies).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Para.	  32,	  ibid.	  75	  Para.	  34,	  ibid.	  76	  See	  Airs,	  p.8	  for	  a	  wider	  discussion	  on	  this	  piece	  of	  terminology.	  
Candidate	  number:	  R6604	  
	   32	  
Counsel	   for	   ICI	   submitted	   that	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   second	   alternative	   would	  create	   anomalies	   between	   groups	   of	   companies,	   that	   the	   legislation	   itself	   was	  ambiguous	   and	   the	   ambiguity	   would	   be	   remedied	   by	   adopting	   the	   approach	  ruled	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal77.	  	  Giving	  the	  lead	  judgment	  in	  the	  case,	  Lord	  Nolan	  rejected	  this	  argument,	  ruling:	  	  
“…	  while	   the	   construction	  adopted	  by	   the	   [Court	   of	   Appeal]	  would	  
certainly	   avoid	   the	   difficulty	   raised	   by	   Art	   5278,	   it	   can	   scarcely	   be	  
described	   as	   conforming	   with	   the	   Article,	   because	   it	   draws	   no	  
distinction	   between	   companies	   resident	   within	   and	   those	   resident	  
outside	  the	  Community.”79	  	  Lord	   Nolan	   then	  moved	   on	   to	   consider	   the	   question	   of	   disapplication	   and	   the	  interaction	  of	  the	  consortium	  relief	  legislation	  with	  s2	  ECA	  1972.	  	  He	  stated:	  	  
“So,	  in	  the	  present	  case,	  the	  effect	  of	  s	  2	  of	  the	  1972	  Act	  is	  the	  same	  as	  
if	  a	  subsection	  were	  incorporated	  in	  s	  258	  of	  the	  1970	  Act	  which	  in	  
terms	   enacted	   that	   the	   definition	   of	   'holding	   company'	   was	   to	   be	  
without	   prejudice	   to	   the	   directly	   enforceable	   Community	   rights	   of	  
companies	   established	   in	   the	   Community.	   As	   the	   concluding	  
paragraphs	  of	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  make	  plain,	  this	  in	  
no	   way	   affects	   the	   application	   of	   the	   definition	   to	   companies	  
established	  outside	  the	  Community.”80	  	  Consequently,	   the	   House	   of	   Lords	   held	   in	   favour	   of	   HMRC	   in	   ruling	   that	  consortium	  relief	  was	  not	  available	  to	  the	  ICI	  holding	  company,	  on	  account	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  subsidiary	  companies	  were	  resident	  outside	  the	  EU	  and	  therefore	  there	  was	  no	  requirement	  to	  disapply	  the	  legislation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  [2000]	  1	  All	  ER	  129	  at	  133	  78	  Now	  Article	  49	  TFEU	  79	  supra.,	  footnote	  77.	  80	  ibid.	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6.1.4. ICI	  v	  Colmer	  –	  some	  observations	  	  Although	  ICI	  as	  the	  taxpayer	  was	  unsuccessful	  in	  the	  case,	  this	  was	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  specific	  facts	  of	  the	  case.	  	  Had	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  subsidiary	  companies	  been	  resident	   in	   the	  EU,	   the	  consortium	  relief	   rules	  would	  have	  been	  ruled	  as	  being	  incompatible	   with	   the	   freedom	   of	   establishment,	   and	   it	   is	   this	   principle	   of	  conformity	   through	   disapplication	   which	   stands	   out	   and	   is	   repeated	   in	   ICI	   v	  
Colmer	  as	  it	  was	  originally	  espoused	  in	  Factortame	  (No.	  2).	  	  	  
6.2. IDT	   Card	   Services	   –	   creating	   a	   taxpayer	   obligation	   towards	   the	   member	  
state?	  	  In	   IDT	  Card	  Services,	   differences	   in	   the	  application	  of	   the	  Sixth	  VAT	  Directive81	  between	  the	  UK	  and	  Ireland	  meant	  that	  no	  VAT	  was	  ever	  charged	  to	  the	  ultimate	  UK	  customers	  of	  an	  Irish	  telecommunications	  company.	  	  This	  was	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  Ireland	  levied	  VAT	  on	  the	  sale	  of	  phone	  cards	  but	  no	  VAT	  on	  the	  provision	  of	  telecommunications	   services,	   whereas	   the	   UK	   charged	   no	   VAT	   on	   the	   sale	   of	  phone	  cards	  but	  did	   levy	  VAT	  on	  the	  provision	  of	  telecommunications	  services.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  supplier	  of	  the	  phone	  cards	  was	  a	  UK	  based	  company	  (and	  so	  not	  required	   to	   levy	   VAT	   in	   the	   UK)	   and	   the	   provider	   of	   the	   telecommunications	  services	   was	   an	   Irish	   company	   (and	   therefore	   not	   required	   to	   charge	   VAT	   in	  Ireland).	  	  	  
6.2.1. Arden	  LJ	  in	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  	  In	   reaching	   a	   conclusion	   contradictory	   to	   that	   of	   the	   High	   Court	   in	   which	   the	  Court	   of	   Appeal	   agreed	   with	   the	   Special	   Commissioners	   and	   HMRC,	   that	   VAT	  could	  be	   levied	  in	  the	  UK	  on	  the	  business	   in	  question,	   the	  court	  (with	  Arden	  LJ	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  Council	  Directive	  (EEC)	  77/388	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giving	  the	  lead	  judgment)	  conducted	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  conforming	  construction	  which	  it	  felt	  were	  in	  point	  in	  the	  case.	  	  The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  began	  by	  reiterating	  the	  point	  made	  in	  Pfeiffer	  that:	  	  
“A	   national	   court	   is	   required,	   when	   applying	   the	   provisions	   of	  
domestic	  law	  adopted	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  transposing	  obligations	  laid	  
down	  by	  a	  Directive,	  to	  consider	  the	  whole	  body	  of	  rules	  of	  national	  
law	   and	   to	   interpret	   them,	   so	   far	   as	   possible,	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	  
wording	  and	  purpose	  of	  the	  Directive	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  an	  outcome	  
consistent	  with	  the	  objective	  pursued	  by	  the	  Directive.”82	  	  Since	  one	  of	   the	  purposes	  of	   the	  Sixth	  VAT	  Directive,	  stated	   in	   the	  preamble	  to	  the	   Directive	   is	   “to	   harmonise	   the	   obligations	   of	   taxpayers	   so	   as	   to	   ensure	   the	  
necessary	   safeguards	   for	   the	   collection	   of	   taxes	   in	   a	   uniform	   manner”,	   was	   it	  therefore	   possible	   to	   reach	   a	   conforming	   interpretation	   of	   VATA	   1994	   in	   line	  with	  the	  objectives	  and	  purpose	  of	  the	  Sixth	  VAT	  Directive?	  	  The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  felt	  that	  it	  was	  possible,	  citing	  Ghaidan	  as	  an	  example	  of	  how	  such	   interpretation	   is	  within	   the	   remit	   of	   the	   courts,	   provided	   that	   it	   does	  not	  
“produce	  a	  meaning	  which	  departed	  substantially	   from	  a	   fundamental	   feature	  or	  
cardinal	  principle	  of	  the	  legislation”83.	  	  The	   final	   result	   was	   that	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   ruled	   in	   favour	   of	   a	   sort	   of	  “conformity	   through	  disapplication”,	   since	   it	  was	   through	   the	   disapplication	   of	  sch.	   10A,	   para	  3(3)	  VATA	  1994	   that	   the	  Court	  was	   able	   to	   reach	   a	   conforming	  interpretation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  Para.	  119,	  Pfeiffer	  as	  cited	  in	  para.	  80	  of	  IDT	  Card	  Services	  83	  See	  para.	  87,	  IDT	  Card	  Services	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6.2.2. IDT	  Card	  Services	  –	  some	  observations	  	  For	   some	   commentators84,	   this	   analysis	   and	   interpretation	   went	   too	   far	   by	  creating	   an	   obligation	   on	   the	   taxpayer	   towards	   the	   State,	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	  implementation	   of	   a	   Directive.	   	   Is	   it	   argued85	  that	   the	   creation	   of	   such	   an	  obligation	  is	  nowhere	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  the	  ECJ,	  and	  Centrosteel	  is	  cited	  as	  evidence	  of	  this,	  in	  which	  the	  ECJ	  ruled:	  	  
“It	   is	   true	   that,	   according	   to	   settled	   case	   law	   of	   the	   Court,	   in	   the	  
absence	   of	   a	   proper	   transposition	   into	   national	   law,	   a	   Directive	  
cannot	  of	  itself	  impose	  obligations	  on	  individuals.”86	  	  The	  key	  phrase	  of	  which	   to	   take	  note	  here	   is	   “of	   itself”.	   	   The	  Directive	   (or	   any	  piece	  of	  EU	  law	  for	  that	  matter)	  is	  not	  the	  only	  piece	  of	  legislation	  to	  which	  the	  domestic	   courts	   should	   have	   regard.	   	   It	   is	   important	   to	   keep	   in	   mind	   the	  obligation	  placed	  on	   the	  UK	   courts,	   as	   a	   result	   of	   s2(4)	  ECA	  1972,	   to	   interpret	  legislation	  in	  accordance	  with	  Treaty	  obligations.	  	  Therefore,	  rather	  than	  seeing	  IDT	  Card	  Services	  as	  an	  example	  of	  where	  the	  Court	  of	   Appeal	   has	   strayed	   into	   judicial	   legislation,	   perhaps	   it	   should	   be	   viewed	   as	  simply	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  conformity	  through	  disapplication	  	  which	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  a	  long	  line	  of	  case	  law,	  as	  evidenced	  above	  in	  Factortame	  (No.	  2)	  and	  ICI	  v	  Colmer,	  and	  as	  will	  be	  seen	  below	  in	  Fleming/Condé	  Nast	  and	  Thin	  Cap	  
GLO.	   	   	   The	   fact	   that	   such	   conformity	   in	   this	   particular	   case	   rules	   against	   the	  taxpayer	   should	   not	   be	   surprising,	   given	   the	   judiciary’s	   ability	   to	   rule	   for	   and	  against	  the	  taxpayer	  according	  to	  the	  bare	  facts	  of	  the	  case,	  as	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  Ramsay	  line	  of	  cases.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  See	  Airs,	  p.2	  85	  ibid.	  86	  Para.	  15,	  Centrosteel,	  author’s	  emphasis.	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6.3. Fleming/Condé	  Nast	  –	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  disapplication	  	  The	   facts	   in	   Fleming/Condé	   Nast	   focused	   on	   the	   modification	   of	   time	   limits	  during	  which	  taxpayers	  could	  claim	  repayment	  of	  amounts	  incorrectly	  remitted	  as	  VAT.	  	  The	  previously	  set	  limit	  of	  6	  years	  was	  reduced	  to	  3	  years	  without	  any	  transitional	  period	  and,	  as	  per	  the	  ECJ’s	  ruling	  in	  Marks	  &	  Spencer	  II	  and	  Grundig	  
II,	  was	  found	  to	  be	  incompatible	  with	  EU	  law.	  	  In	  the	  subsequent	  House	  of	  Lords	  decision,	  the	  key	  issue	  was	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  UK	   courts	   could	   interpret	   the	   UK	   legislation	   as	   being	   subject	   to	   a	   time	   limit	  which	  did	  comply	  with	  EU	  law.	  	  Lord	  Hope	  stated:	  	  
“Legislation	   that	   is	   incompatible	   with	   EU	   law	   must	   be	   disapplied.	  
But	  can	  the	  court	  go	  further	  and	  make	  good	  the	  defect	  which	  has	  led	  
to	  its	  disapplication?”87	  	  He	  answered	  the	  question	  by	  ruling:	  	  
“I	  would	  not	  rule	  out	   the	  possibility,	   in	  a	  suitable	  case,	  of	   the	  court	  
reaching	  its	  own	  decision	  as	  to	  what	  would	  be	  a	  reasonable	  time	  for	  
the	  making	   of	   claims	   and	   rejecting	   claims	   that	  were	  made	   after	   a	  
period	  which	   it	   held	   to	   be	   reasonable.	   But	   I	   do	   not	   think	   that	   the	  
situation	  disclosed	  by	  these	  appeals	  lends	  itself	  to	  that	  treatment.	  In	  
my	  opinion	  this	  is	  a	  step	  too	  far	  for	  the	  court	  to	  take.	  The	  issue	  is	  not	  
one	   of	   statutory	   interpretation,	   for	   which	   the	   court	   must	   accept	  
responsibility.	  There	  is	  a	  gap	  in	  the	  legislation	  which	  is	  unfilled.”88	  
	  The	  House	  of	  Lords	  ultimately	  ruled	  that	  it	  was	  not	  able	  to	  read	  into	  legislation	  a	  time	   limit	  which	  was	  compatible	  with	  UK	   law	  and,	  as	  such,	   the	   taxpayers	  were	  free	   to	  make	  claims	   for	   the	  repayment	  of	  VAT	  without	  any	   limitation	  of	   time89.	  	  One	  interesting	  element	  of	  this	  decision	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  saw	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  Para.	  6,	  Fleming/Condé	  Nast 88	  Para.	  10,	  Fleming/Condé	  Nast	  89	  Airs,	  p.6	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the	  case	   in	  point	  as	  one	  of	  disapplication	   rather	   than	  conforming	  construction,	  and	  that	  these	  two	  concepts	  were	  fundamentally	  different.	  	  Lord	  Walker	  ruled:	  	  
“Disapplication	   of	   national	   legislation	   is	   an	   essentially	   different	  
process	  from	  its	  interpretation	  so	  as	  to	  conform	  with	  EU	  law.	  Only	  in	  
the	   most	   formal	   sense	   (because	   of	   the	   terms	   of	   s	   2(4)	   of	   the	  
European	  Communities	  Act	  1972)	  can	  disapplication	  be	  described	  as	  
a	  process	  of	  construction.”90	  
	  In	   the	   purest	   sense,	   it	   must	   be	   the	   case	   that	   conforming	   interpretation	   and	  disapplication	   are	   fundamentally	   different.	   	   In	   relation	   to	   the	   former,	   the	  domestic	  legislation	  continues	  to	  exist	  but	  is	  construed	  in	  a	  manner	  to	  render	  it	  compatible	   with	   EU	   law.	   	   In	   the	   latter	   case,	   the	   domestic	   rule	   is	   set	   aside	   in	  favour	  of	  a	  directly	  enforceable	  EU	  law	  right.	   	  However,	  as	  should	  later	  become	  clear	   in	   the	   context	   of	  Vodafone	  2	   and	  Thin	  Cap	  GLO,	   from	   a	   practical	   point	   of	  view	  it	  is	  often	  not	  entirely	  relevant	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  principle	  of	  conforming	  interpretation	  or	   that	  of	  disapplication	   is	  applied,	   since	   the	  result	  will	  often	  be	  the	  same.	  	  	  
6.4. Conforming	  interpretation	  in	  the	  field	  of	  UK	  tax	  –	  some	  observations	  	  It	  was	  clear	  in	  Macarthys	  Ltd	  v	  Smith	  that	  the	  UK	  courts	  were	  prepared	  to	  adopt	  a	  conforming	  interpretation	  approach	  in	  order	  to	  read	  domestic	  legislation	  in	  line	  with	  EU	  law.	  	  However,	  this	  method	  was	  not	  considered	  applicable	  in	  Factortame	  
(No.	  2)	  and	  the	  principle	  of	  disapplication	  was	  applied.	  	  A	  similar	  approach	  has	  been	  taken	  in	  areas	  of	  the	  UK	  tax	  statue	  which	  are	  held	  to	  be	   inconsistent	  with	  EU	   law	   rights	   and	   obligations.	   	   Consistent	   rulings	   in	   ICI	  v	  
Colmer,	   IDT	   Card	   Services	   and	   Fleming/Condé	   Nast	   have	   shown	   that	   the	   UK	  courts	   are	   willing	   to	   strike	   out	   domestic	   legislation	   where	   it	   is	   shown	   to	   be	  incompatible	  with	  EU	  law.	  	  The	  interesting	  question,	  therefore,	  is	  why	  the	  Court	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  Para.	  25,	  Fleming/Condé	  Nast	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of	  Appeal	  felt	  able	  to	  adopt	  a	  conforming	  interpretation	  approach	  in	  Vodafone	  2	  which	   is	   viewed	   by	   some	   as	   having	   stepped	   over	   the	   line	   into	   judicial	   policy	  making,	   particularly	   in	   light	   of	   the	   effectively	   contemporaneous	   judgment	  handed	  down	   in	  Thin	  Cap	  GLO.	   	   It	   is	  on	   these	  points	  which	   the	  analysis	   in	   this	  paper	  will	  now	  concentrate.	  	  	  
7. Vodafone	  2	  and	  conforming	  construction	  	  A	  full	  analysis	  of	  the	  reasoning	  behind	  the	  judgment	  handed	  down	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  in	  Vodafone	  2	  requires	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  case.	  	  	  
7.1. Vodafone	  2	  -­‐	  the	  facts	  
	  As	   part	   of	   its	   acquisition	   of	   the	   rival	   German	   telecommunications	   company,	  Mannesmann	   AG,	   Vodafone	   Group	   Plc	   established	   a	   Luxembourg	   resident	  holding	   company,	   Vodafone	   Investments	   Luxembourg	   SarL	   (“VIL”).	   	   Another	  Vodafone	  group	  company	  in	  the	  UK,	  Vodafone	  2,	  held	  the	  share	  capital	  in	  VIL.	  	  In	  the	  financial	  year	  ended	  31	  March	  2001,	  VIL	  earned	  substantial	  income	  from	  its	  newly	  acquired	  assets.	  	  HMRC	  argued	  that	  VIL	  constituted	  a	  CFC	  under	  the	  UK	  CFC	   legislation91	  and	   issued	   an	   enquiry	   notice	   to	   Vodafone	   2	   in	   respect	   of	   the	  additional	  tax	  payable.	  	  Vodafone	  2’s	  analysis	  of	   the	  UK	  CFC	  legislation	  concluded	  that	  whilst	   it	  did	  not	  meet	   the	  traditional	  exemptions	   from	  the	  CFC	  apportionment	  charge	  that	  were	  available,	  its	  shareholding	  in	  VIL	  also	  did	  not	  fall	  into	  s748(3)	  ICTA;	  the	  so-­‐called	  “motive	  test”.	   	  The	  motive	  test	  is	  the	  section	  of	  the	  CFC	  legislation	  that	  seeks	  to	  prevent	   profits	   from	   being	   artificially	   diverted	   away	   from	   the	   UK	   and	   thus	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  It	  is	  not	  the	  intention	  of	  this	  paper	  to	  explain	  in	  detail	  the	  UK	  CFC	  legislation,	  but	  see	  Wellens	  (Pt	  1)	  pp.	  1-­‐2	   for	  an	  overview	  of	   the	  relevant	  sections	  of	   the	  UK	   tax	  code	  which	  applied	  at	   the	  time	  of	  the	  case.	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avoiding	  any	  charge	  to	  UK	  tax.	   	   It	  achieves	   this	  by	  apportioning	  such	  profits	  as	  earned	   in	   a	   CFC	   to	   the	   UK	   parent	   company	   and	   taxing	   those	   profits	   at	   the	  prevailing	  UK	  corporation	  tax	  rate.	  	  Vodafone	  2	  contested	  the	  enquiry	  notice	  issued	  by	  HMRC,	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  it	  was	  contrary	   to	   the	   freedom	  of	  establishment	  under	  Article	  43	  EC92.	   	  The	  challenge	  was	  based	  on	  an	  argument	  that	  Vodafone	  2	  would	  not	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  set	  of	   rules	   if	   it	   had	   established	   a	   UK	   resident	   subsidiary	   and,	   furthermore,	   the	  administrative	   burden	  of	   complying	  with	   the	  UK	  CFC	   legislation	   constituted	   of	  itself	  a	  restriction	  on	  Vodafone	  2’s	  freedom	  of	  establishment93.	  	  	  
7.1.1. Cadbury	  Schweppes94	  
	  A	   considerable	   precedent	   for	   this	   line	   of	   argumentation	   had	   recently	   been	  established	  in	  the	  ECJ.	  	  In	  its	  Cadbury	  Schweppes	  ruling,	  the	  ECJ	  found	  that	  it	  was	  possible	   for	   the	   UK	   CFC	   rules	   to	   constitute	   a	   restriction	   on	   the	   freedom	   of	  establishment	   (for	  much	   the	   same	   reasons	   as	   argued	  by	  Vodafone	  2),	   but	   that	  this	  restriction	  may	  be	  justified	  where	  the	  facts	  in	  question	  related	  to:	  	  	  
“wholly	   artificial	   arrangements	   aimed	   at	   circumventing	   the	  
application	  of	  the	  legislation	  of	  the	  Member	  State	  concerned.”95	  	  This	  limited	  level	  of	   justification	  was	  consistent	  with	  the	  ECJ’s	  interpretation	  of	  the	  freedom	  of	  establishment	  in	  Cadbury	  Schweppes,	  which:	  	  
“presupposes	  actual	   establishment	   ...	   in	   the	  host	  Member	  State	  and	  
the	  pursuit	  of	  genuine	  economic	  activity	  there.”96	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  Now	  Article	  49	  TFEU.	  93	  See	  para	  13,	  Vodafone	  2	  (EWHC)	  94	  There	  is	  a	  large	  selection	  of	  material	  available	  which	  explains	  the	  Cadbury	  Schweppes	  case.	  	  See,	  in	  particular,	  Wellens	  (Pt	  1),	  pp.	  2-­‐9	  and	  O’Shea	  (CFC	  rules)	  for	  further	  details	  and	  analysis.	  95	  Para.	  51,	  Cadbury	  Schweppes	  96	  Para.	  54,	  Cadbury	  Schweppes	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In	   summary,	   the	   ECJ	   ruled97	  that	  where	   the	   national	   court	   could	   interpret	   the	  motive	   test	   in	   the	   UK	   CFC	   legislation	   as	   excluding	   overseas	   subsidiaries	   from	  taxation,	   except	   in	   circumstances	   where	   wholly	   artificial	   arrangements	   arise,	  then	  the	  UK’s	  CFC	  rules	  were	  compatible	  with	  the	  freedom	  of	  establishment.	  	  	  However,	  where	  the	  motive	  test	  has	  to	  be	  interpreted	  as	  meaning	  that:	  	  
• None	  of	  the	  exceptions	  to	  the	  UK’s	  CFC	  rules	  applies;	  
• The	  intention	  to	  obtain	  a	  reduction	  in	  UK	  tax	  is	  central	  to	  the	  reasons	  for	  incorporating	  the	  CFC;	  and	  	  
• The	  UK	  parent	  company	  comes	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  CFC	  rules,	  despite	  the	   absence	   of	   objective	   evidence	   to	   indicate	   that	   a	   wholly	   artificial	  arrangement	  exists;	  	  then	   the	   UK	   CFC	   legislation	   must	   be	   considered	   to	   be	   incompatible	   with	   the	  freedom	  of	  establishment.	  	  	  
7.2. Vodafone	  2	  in	  the	  High	  Court	  
	  The	  first	  main	  examination	  in	  the	  national	  courts	  of	  how	  to	  interpret	  the	  motive	  test	   contained	   in	   the	   CFC	   legislation	   came	   in	   the	   Vodafone	   2	   case	   at	   the	   High	  Court.	  	  Evans-­‐Lombe	  J	  began	  his	  analysis	  by	  considering	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  national	  courts	  are	  required	  to	  find	  a	  conforming	  interpretation	  of	  domestic	  legislation	  in	  respect	  of	  obligations	  under	  ECA	  1972.	  	  He	  stated:	  	  
“where	   legislation	  can	  be	   reasonably	  construed	  as	   to	  conform	  with	  
the	   United	   Kingdom’s	   Community	   obligations,	   the	   English	   Courts	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  See	  paras.	  72-­‐74	  of	  Cadbury	  Schweppes	  and	  O’Shea	  (CFC	  rules),	  p.	  20.	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must	   do	   so,	   even	   if	   this	   involves	   a	   departure	   from	   the	   strict	   and	  
literal	  interpretation	  of	  the	  words	  in	  the	  legislation.”98	  	  Despite	  this	  initial	  analysis,	  Evans-­‐Lombe	  J	  ultimately	  ruled	  that	  the	  motive	  test	  in	   s748(3)	   ICTA	   could	   not	   be	   interpreted	   such	   that	   the	   application	   of	   the	   CFC	  rules	   was	   restricted	   to	   companies	   which	   form	   part	   of	   a	   wholly	   artificial	  arrangement.	  He	  confirmed	  that:	  	  
“the	  Cadbury	  case	  establishes	  that	  an	  intention	  to	  avoid	  tax	  does	  not,	  
by	  itself,	  render	  a	  transaction	  involving	  a	  CFC	  resident	  in	  a	  member	  
state,	  an	  artificial	  arrangement	  and	  so	  abusive.”99	  	  Stating	  further:	  	  
“The	  provisions	  of	   subsection	   (3)	   [of	   s748	   ICTA	   -­‐	   the	  motive	   test]	  
are	   unambiguous	   and	   its	   purpose	   is	   plain,	   namely,	   to	   defeat	   tax	  
avoidance	  by	  parent	  companies	  resident	  for	  tax	  purposes	  in	  the	  UK	  ...	  
There	  are	  no	  words	  in	  subsection	  (3)	  which,	  using	  conventional	  rules	  
of	   construction,	   are	   capable	   of	   being	   construed	   as	   limiting	   the	  
operation	   of	   the	   subsection	   so	   as	   to	   comply	   with	   Article	   43100	  as	  
explained	  in	  the	  Cadbury	  case.”101	  
	  	  
7.3. Vodafone	  2	  in	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  
	  Whereas	   Evans-­‐Lombe	   J	   in	   the	   High	   Court	   restricted	   his	   conforming	  interpretation	  analysis	  to	  the	  motive	  test	  (since	  this	  was	  the	  element	  of	  the	  UK	  CFC	   legislation	   analysed	   by	   the	   ECJ),	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   took	   a	   much	   wider	  starting	  approach,	  disagreeing	  with	  submissions	  from	  Vodafone	  2’s	  counsel	  and	  stating:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  Para.	  42,	  Vodafone	  2	  (EWHC)	  99	  Para.	  73(v),	  Vodafone	  2	  (EWHC)	  100	  Now	  Article	  49,	  TEU	  101	  Para.	  73(ii)	  Vodafone	  2	  (EWHC)	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“the	  obligation	  of	   the	  national	  court	   is	   to	  examine	  the	  whole	  of	   the	  
national	  law	  to	  consider	  how	  far	  it	  may	  be	  applied	  so	  as	  to	  conform	  
to	  enforceable	  Community	  rights.”102	  	  This	   is	   consistent	   with	   the	   ECJ	   jurisprudence	   in	   cases	   such	   as	   Pfeiffer	   and	  domestic	   jurisprudence	  in	  the	  field	  of	  EU	  law	  in	  IDT	  Card	  Services.	   	   It	   is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  felt	  able	  to	  review	  the	  CFC	  rules	  in	  their	  entirety	  and	   not	   just	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	  motive	   test,	   such	   limited	   analysis	   as	   had	   been	  conducted	  by	  Evans-­‐Lombe	   J	   in	   the	  High	  Court103.	   	   	  Consequently,	   the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  was	  able	  to	  consider	  the	  ‘thrust’	  of	  the	  CFC	  legislation	  as	  being	  to	  cast	  the	  net	   widely,	   covering	   ostensibly	   all	   foreign	   subsidiary	   companies,	   and	   then	   to	  narrow	   the	   impact	   as	   the	   relevant	  exclusions	   contained	   in	   the	   legislation	  were	  met104.	  	  In	  this	  context,	  counsel	  for	  HMRC	  contended	  that	  it	  would	  be	  possible	  simply	  to	  add	  another	  exclusion	  to	  the	  list,	  which	  would	  remove	  any	  potentially	  unjustified	  restriction	  of	  EU	  Treaty	  rights,	  namely:	  	  
“if	   it	  [the	  CFC]	   is,	   in	  that	  accounting	  period,	  actually	  established	   in	  
another	  member	  state	  of	   the	  EEA	  and	  carries	  on	  genuine	  economic	  
activities	  there.”105	  	  Vodafone	  2	  argued	  against	  this,	  citing	  Lord	  Roger	  of	  Earlsferry	  in	  Ghaidan:	  	  
“[s.3	  HRA	  1998]	  does	  not	  allow	  the	  courts	  to	  change	  the	  substance	  
of	   a	   provision	   completely,	   to	   change	   a	   provision	   from	   one	   where	  
Parliament	  says	  that	  x	   is	   to	  happen	  into	  one	  saying	  that	  x	   is	  not	  to	  
happen.”106	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  Para.	  34,	  Vodafone	  2	  (EWCA)	  103	  See	  para.	  60,	  Vodafone	  2(EWCA)	  104	  See	  para.	  39,	  Vodafone	  2	  (EWCA)	  105	  ibid.	  106	  Para.	  110,	  Ghaidan	  as	  cited	  in	  para.	  41,	  Vodafone	  2	  (EWCA)	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  The	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   did	   not	   accept	   this	   line	   of	   reasoning,	   and	   held	   that	   the	  proposed	   wording	   from	   counsel	   for	   HMRC	   did	   not	   alter	   the	   essence	   of	   the	  legislation:	  	  
“…the	  words	  which	  the	  Revenue	  suggest	  should	  be	  inserted	  into	  the	  
Act	   to	  ensure	   its	   compliance	  with	  Article	  43107	  of	  EU	  Treaty	  do	  not	  
create	  a	  new	  and	  different	  scheme	  nor	  do	  they	  offend	  any	  of	  the	  Act’s	  
cardinal	  principles…”108	  
	  	  
7.4. The	  principles	  of	  conforming	  construction	  in	  Vodafone	  2	  	  In	   reaching	   the	   conclusion	   above,	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   conducted	   analysis	   of	  previous	   case	   law	   in	   the	   area	  of	   conforming	   interpretation,	   and	   it	   summarised	  the	  central	  tenets	  of	  such	  an	  approach	  when	  dealing	  with	  EU	  law109.	  	  The	  analysis	  now	  turns	  to	  consider	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  these	  guiding	  tenets	  of	  interpretation	  as	  stated	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  in	  Vodafone	  2	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  principles	  espoused	   in	  previous	   jurisprudence	  of	  both	   the	  ECJ	  and	   the	  domestic	  courts	   in	  respect	  of	  supremacy	  of	  EU	  law	  and	  conforming	  interpretation.	  	  	  
7.4.1. How	  and	  when	  can	  a	  conforming	  interpretation	  be	  applied?	  	  In	   Vodafone	   2	   (EWCA),	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   first	   gives	   guidance	   as	   to	   when	   a	  conforming	   interpretation	   can	   be	   applied	   and	   the	   circumstances	   in	  which	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  do	  so.	  	  Firstly,	  there	  is	  no	  requirement	  for	  any	  ambiguity	  in	  the	  area	  of	   the	   statute	   to	   be	   construed110.	   	   This	   seems	   to	   contrast	   with	   the	   traditional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  Now	  Article	  49	  TFEU	  108	  Para.	  71,	  Vodafone	  2	  (EWCA)	  109	  See	  paras.	  37(a)-­‐(f)	  and	  38(a)-­‐(b),	  Vodafone	  2	  (EWCA).	  110	  See	  para.	  37(b),	  Vodafone	  2	  (EWCA)	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domestic	   approach	   to	   interpretation,	   where	   the	   words	   should	   be	   given	   their	  
“ordinary	  meaning	  and	  purpose”111.	  	  	  	  In	   domestic	   situations,	   where	   the	   meaning	   of	   the	   words	   is	   clear,	   there	   is	   no	  option	  (or	  indeed	  any	  requirement)	  to	  invoke	  a	  conforming	  interpretation,	  but	  in	  the	  EU	  context	  this	  restriction	  on	  attempting	  a	  conforming	  construction	  does	  not,	  in	  the	  view	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal,	  apply.	  	  Secondly,	  and	  linked	  to	  this	  point,	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	   ruled	   that	   conforming	   interpretation	   is	  not	   constrained	  by	   the	  conventional	  rules	  of	  construction112.	  	  This	   release	   from	   the	   conventional	   rules	   of	   construction	   is	   important	   in	   the	  context	  of	  EU	   law,	  since	  domestic	  courts	  are	  being	  asked	   to	   interpret	  domestic	  legislation	   in	   light	   of	   overriding	   EU	   law	   principles	   which	   are	   not	   as	   tightly	  drafted	   as	   specific	   national	   legislation	   where	   conventional	   rules	   have	   been	  developed	  and	  can	  be	  consistently	  applied.	  	  
7.4.2. “Going	  with	  the	  grain”	  	  Arguably	  the	  most	  important	  of	  the	  principles	  put	  forward	  in	  the	  judgment	  was	  that	  stated	  in	  para.	  38(a),	  which	  held	  that	  a	  conforming	  interpretation	  must	  “go	  with	  the	  grain”	  and	  “be	  compatible	  with	  the	  underlying	  thrust	  of	  the	  legislation	  being	   construed”.	   	   This	   language	   was	   drawn	   from	   Ghaidan113	  and	   EB	   Central	  
Services114	  and	  was	   further	  supplemented	  by	  the	  notion	  that	  any	   interpretation	  which	  was	  not	  consistent	  with	  a	  cardinal	   feature	  of	   the	   legislation	  would	  cross	  the	  boundary	  between	  interpretation	  and	  amendment115.	  	  This	  principle	  of	  conforming	  interpretation	  is	  crucial	   in	  any	  analysis,	  because	  if	  the	  proposed	  construction	  does	  not	  fall	  into	  the	  broad	  categories	  outlined	  above,	  any	  further	  analysis	  of	  the	  form	  or	  substance	  of	  the	  construction	  is	  meaningless.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	  See,	  for	  example,	  Marshall	  [1994]	  STC	  638	  at	  649	  112	  See	  para.	  37(a),	  Vodafone	  2	  (EWCA)	  113	  See	  para.	  33,	  Ghaidan	  114	  See	  para.	  81,	  EB	  Central	  Services	  115	  See	  paras.	  33	  &	  110-­‐113,	  Ghaidan	  and	  paras.	  82	  &	  113,	  IDT	  Card	  Services	  for	  the	  reference	  in	  previous	  case	  law	  to	  this	  element	  of	  the	  principle.	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  This	   approach	   is	   not	   entirely	   dissimilar	   to	   the	   jurisprudence	   built	   up	   in	   the	  domestic	   courts	   in	   the	  Ramsay	   line	   of	   cases.	   	   As	   described	   above,	   the	   current	  position	  according	  to	  the	  Ramsay	  principle	  is	  that	  domestic	  courts	  are	  entitled	  to	  take	  a	  purposive	  view	  of	   the	   legislation	  when	   interpreting	   the	   facts	  of	   the	  case	  and	   their	  application	   to	   the	   legislation	   in	  question.	   	  This	  does	  not	  seem	  too	   far	  removed	  from	  the	  principle	  of	  interpreting	  legislation	  so	  as	  to	  “go	  with	  the	  grain”	  and	  “be	  compatible	  with	  the	  underlying	  thrust	  of	  the	  legislation”.	  	  	  Finally,	   it	   should	   not	   be	   forgotten	   that	   quite	   apart	   from	   the	   domestic	   and	   ECJ	  jurisprudence	  which	   permitted	   this	   type	   of	   analysis	   of	   the	   CFC	   legislation,	   the	  Court	   of	   Appeal	   was	   ultimately	   obliged	   to	   adopt	   this	   approach	   through	  obligations	  imposed	  on	  the	  UK	  through	  s2	  ECA	  1972	  to	  comply	  with	  EU	  law.	  	  	  
7.4.3. A	  question	  of	  semantics?	  	  Having	  established	   that	   conforming	  construction	  with	  EU	   law	  does	  not	   require	  ambiguity	   to	   be	   present,	   is	   not	   bound	   by	   traditional	   rules	   of	   construction	   and	  should	  not	  offend	  the	  cardinal	  features	  of	  the	  relevant	  legislation,	  the	  remaining	  part	   of	   the	   guidance	   issued	   by	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   then	   falls	   to	   describe	   the	  linguistic	   techniques	   which	   are	   permissible	   in	   reaching	   such	   a	   conforming	  interpretation.	  	  The	   guidelines	   in	   respect	   of	   this	   are	   contained	   in	   paras.	   37(c)	   –	   (f)	   of	   the	  
Vodafone	  2	  (EWCA)	  judgment,	  and	  can	  be	  summarised	  thus:	  	   i. Conforming	  construction	  is	  not	  an	  exercise	  in	  semantics	  or	  linguistics;	  ii. Departure	   from	   the	   literal	  meaning	   of	   the	  words	  used	  by	  Parliament	   is	  permitted;	  iii. It	  is	  permitted	  to	  substitute	  words	  in	  the	  statute	  for	  those	  which	  enable	  a	  conforming	  interpretation	  with	  EU	  Treaty	  obligations;	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iv. The	  precise	  form	  of	  the	  words	  does	  not	  matter:	  	  	  	  At	   first	   glance,	   these	   principles	   may	   seem	   anathema	   to	   those	   used	   to	   more	  traditional	  approaches	  to	  statutory	  interpretation.	   	  However,	  ECJ	   jurisprudence	  confirms116 	  that	   domestic	   courts	   should	   “if	   the	   application	   of	   interpretative	  
methods	  recognised	  by	  national	  law	  enables”,	  construe	  national	  law	  so	  as	  to	  be	  in	  accordance	  with	   EU	   law.	   	   Using	   traditional	  methods	   of	   construction	   in	   the	   UK	  would	   most	   likely	   limit	   the	   ability	   of	   the	   courts	   to	   apply	   a	   conforming	  construction	  as	  suggested	  in	  Vodafone	  2.	  	  	  	  However,	   s2	   ECA	   1972	   releases	   the	   domestic	   courts	   from	   the	   requirement	   to	  apply	   a	   strict	   and	   literal	   approach	   to	   interpretation	   (as	   might	   be	   expected	   in	  domestic	  jurisprudence)	  and	  permits,	  or	  even	  obliges,	  the	  courts	  to	  use	  broader	  interpretative	   techniques.	   	   Indeed,	   this	  was	   recognised	   by	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	  when	  it	  ruled:	  	  
“It	   is	   inevitable	   that	   …	   conforming	   interpretation	   will	   lack	   the	  
crispness	  to	  be	  expected	  of	  a	  properly	  considered	  legislation.”117	  	  	  
7.4.4. The	  conforming	  construction	  safety	  valve	  	  The	  ability	  of	  the	  courts	  to	  use	  what	  would	  be	  considered	  from	  a	  domestic	  point	  of	   view	  non-­‐standard	  methods	   of	   construction	  when	   considering	   compatibility	  with	   EU	   law	   does	   seem	   to	   give	   them	   a	   wider	   scope	   to	   adopt	   a	   conforming	  interpretation.	  	  Having	  said	  that,	  the	  judgment	  in	  Vodafone	  2	  (EWCA)	  did	  provide	  for	  a	  check	  and	  balance	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  courts	  could	  pursue	  a	  given	  line	  of	  interpretation.	  	  This	  safety	  valve	  was	  summarised	  thus:	  	  
“The	  exercise	  of	   interpretative	  obligation	  cannot	  require	   the	  courts	  
to	  make	  a	  decision	   for	  which	   they	  are	  not	   equipped	  or	  give	   rise	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  116	  See	  para.	  116,	  Pfeiffer	  117	  Para.	  57,	  Vodafone	  2	  (EWCA)	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important	  practical	  repercussions	  which	  the	  court	  is	  not	  equipped	  to	  
evaluate.”118	  	  A	   hypothetical	   example	   of	   such	   a	   situation	  was	   given	   by	  Arden	   LJ	   in	   IDT	  Card	  
Services119	  where,	   in	   construing	   domestic	   law	   so	   as	   to	   comply	  with	   obligations	  under	  EU	  law,	  the	  resulting	  interpretation	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  limiting	  the	  rights	  of	  third	   parties	   such	   as	   creditors	   or	   consumers.	   	   Despite	   this	   qualification	   of	   the	  limits	  of	  conforming	  interpretation,	  the	  reading	  in	  of	  the	  additional	  exception	  in	  the	   CFC	   legislation	   in	   Vodafone	   2	   (EWCA)	   cannot	   be	   viewed	   as	   having	   such	  consequences,	  and	  so	  cannot	  constitute	  a	  decision	   for	  which	  the	  courts	  are	  not	  equipped	  and	  which	  gives	  rise	  to	  important	  practical	  repercussions,	  since	  it	  does	  not	  infringe	  on	  the	  rights	  of	  any	  third	  parties.	  	  
7.5. Vodafone	  2	  –	  some	  observations	  	  One	  view	  of	  the	  conforming	  interpretation	  reached	  in	  Vodafone	  2	  (EWCA)	  might	  be	  that	  it	  stepped	  across	  the	  line	  into	  judicial	  activism	  rather	  than	  protectionism.	  	  However,	  as	  outlined	  in	  the	  judgment	  itself,	  the	  courts	  view	  it	  as	  their	  duty	  to	  use	  all	  possible	  techniques	  to	  achieve	  an	  interpretation	  which	  is	  compatible	  with	  EU	  law.	  	  In	  Vodafone	  2	  (EWCA),	  the	  court	  ruled:	  	  
	  “…	  there	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  other	  ways	  of	  achieving	  conformity	  …	  and	  
the	   choice	   of	   one	   rather	   than	   another	   may	   well	   involve	   policy	  
decisions.	  But	  if	  that	  consideration	  alone	  could	  render	  a	  conforming	  
interpretation	   illegitimate	   it	   would	   considerably	   restrict	   the	  
occasions	   in	   which	   a	   conforming	   interpretation	   could	   be	   adopted	  
and	   lead	   to	   an	   increase	   in	   disapplications.	   The	   choice	   of	   a	  
conforming	   interpretation	   which	   faithfully	   follows	   a	   conclusion	   of	  
the	  ECJ,	  as	  in	  this	  case,	  does	  not	  in	  my	  view	  trespass	  on	  the	  forbidden	  
ground	  of	  legislation.”120	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118	  Para.	  38(b),	  Vodafone	  2	  (EWCA)	  119	  See	  para.	  113,	  IDT	  Card	  Services	  120	  Para.	  59,	  Vodafone	  2	  (EWCA)	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  The	   implication	   of	   this	   is	   that	   the	   courts	   should	   not	   be	   viewed	   as	   stepping	  outside	  their	  spheres	  of	  influence	  when	  following	  an	  ECJ	  judgment,	  even	  where	  to	  so	  do	  would	  involve	  reinterpreting	  domestic	  legislation	  in	  a	  manner	  which	  –	  in	  domestic	  circumstances	  –	  might	  be	  left	  to	  Parliament121.	   	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  inference	   is	  plain:	  Parliament	  gave	  the	  courts	  the	   interpretative	  tools122	  to	  take	  this	   type	  of	  approach	   in	  dealing	  with	  EU	   law	   issues	  when	   it	  enacted	  s2(4)	  ECA	  1972.	  	  	  
8. Thin	  Cap	  GLO	  –	  conforming	  interpretation	  or	  disapplication?	  	  
8.1. Facts	  of	  the	  case	  	  The	   latest	   case	   to	   come	   before	   the	   domestic	   courts	   where	   the	   principle	   of	  conforming	  interpretation	  versus	  that	  of	  disapplication	  was	  considered	  was	  Thin	  
Cap	  GLO123.	  	  It	  concerned	  the	  thin	  capitalisation	  (“thin	  cap”)	  rules	  in	  the	  UK	  prior	  to	  1994	  which	  treated	  certain	  interest	  payments	  from	  UK	  resident	  companies	  to	  non-­‐resident	   group	   companies	   as	   non-­‐deductible	   where	   the	   interest	   charged	  was	  not	  on	  an	  arm’s	  length	  basis.	  	  A	   raft	   of	   claims	   in	   the	   domestic	   courts	   to	   the	  UK’s	   thin	   cap	   rules	   followed	   the	  ECJ’s	  ruling	  in	  the	  Lankhorst-­Hohorst	  case	  which	  address	  substantively	  the	  same	  issue	   in	   respect	   of	   Germany’s	   thin	   cap	   rules,	   and	   eventually	   the	   issue	   was	  referred	  to	  the	  ECJ	  from	  the	  High	  Court.	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  Klass,	  p.545	  122	  At	   the	   same	   time	   as,	   through	   s2(1)	  ECA	  1972,	   giving	   freedom	  of	   establishment	   and	  EU	   law	  rules	  which	  carry	  direct	  effect	  the	  same	  status	  as	  other	  UK	  legal	  rights.	  123	  See	  Camp,	  p.1	  and	  Fichardt,	  p.90	  for	  a	  full	  description	  of	  the	  facts	  in	  the	  case.	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8.2. The	  ECJ’s	  view	  	  The	  ECJ	  held	  that	  the	  thin	  cap	  rules	  constituted	  a	  restriction	  on	  the	  freedom	  of	  establishment124,	  but	  that	  such	  a	  restriction	  was	  justified	  in	  circumstances	  where	  the	   domestic	   legislation	   was	   designed	   to	   prevent	   “wholly	   artificial	  
arrangements”125.	   	   In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  thin	  cap	  rules,	  such	  arrangements	  were	  defined	   as	   interest	   charged	   at	   a	   non-­‐arm’s	   length	   rate126,	   but	   crucially	   were	  subject	   to	   the	   taxpayer	   being	   afforded	   the	   opportunity	   to	   prove	   a	   commercial	  justification	  for	  the	  transaction127.	  	  	  
8.3. The	  High	  Court	  ruling	  	  In	  the	  High	  Court,	  Henderson	  J	   found	  that	  the	  UK’s	  pre-­‐1994	  thin	  cap	  rules	  did	  breach	  the	  Treaty	  obligation	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  freedom	  of	  establishment	  because	  although	   they	   contained	   an	   arm’s	   length	   test,	   there	   was	   no	   corresponding	  commerciality	  test.	  	  He	  ruled:	  	  
“In	   simple	   terms,	   the	   arm's	   length	   test,	   which	   the	   ECJ	   regarded	   as	  
essentially	  objective	  and	  capable	  of	  independent	  verification,	  needed	  
to	  be,	  but	  was	  not,	  supplemented	  by	  an	  essentially	  subjective	  motive	  
test,	   in	   order	   to	   filter	   out	   and	   save	   from	   counteraction	   those	  
transactions	   which,	   although	   they	   failed	   the	   arm's	   length	   test,	  
nevertheless	  had	  (either	  in	  whole	  or	  in	  the	  relevant	  part)	  a	  genuine	  
commercial	  justification.”128	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  124	  See	  para.	  63	  of	  the	  ECJ’s	  ruling	  on	  the	  Thin	  Cap	  GLO	  case	  C-­‐524/04	  [2007]	  ECR	  I-­‐2107	  125	  See	  paras.	  71-­‐74	  of	  the	  ECJ’s	  judgment	  in	  Thin	  Cap	  GLO.	  126	  See	  paras.	  81-­‐82	  of	  the	  ECJ’s	  judgment	  in	  Thin	  Cap	  GLO.	  127	  See	  para.	  82	  of	  the	  ECJ’s	  judgment	  in	  Thin	  Cap	  GLO.	  128	  Para.	  77,	  Thin	  Cap	  GLO	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8.4. Conforming	  interpretation	  or	  disapplication?	  	  Henderson	  J	  then	  turned	  to	  consider	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  conforming	  interpretation	  was	  possible,	  and	  he	  drew	  on	  the	  principles	  as	  defined	  in	  Vodafone	  2	  (EWCA).	  	  He	  found	  that	  it	  was	  not	  possible	  to	  construe	  the	  thin	  cap	  rules	  in	  such	  a	  way	  so	  as	  to	   include	   the	   commercial	   justification	   test	  which	  was	   required	   under	   the	   ECJ	  ruling	  to	  meet	  the	  principle	  or	  proportionality:	  	  
“In	  my	   judgment	   there	   is	  no	  process	  of	   construction,	   even	  allowing	  
for	  the	  width	  and	  potency	  of	  the	  principles	  identified	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  
Appeal	  in	  Vodafone	  2,	  which	  could	  treat	  the	  arm's	  length	  test	  in	  the	  
UK	  thin	  cap	  rules,	  either	  before	  or	  after	  1995,	  as	  supplemented	  by	  a	  
separate	  test	  of	  commercial	  motive	  or	  purpose.”129	  	  It	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   introduction	   of	   a	   “motive	   test”	   to	   the	   thin	   cap	   rules	   via	   the	  principle	   of	   conforming	   interpretation	   would	   have	   cut	   across	   the	   grain	   of	   the	  legislation	   and	   offended	   the	   cardinal	   principles	   of	   the	   legislation.	   	   This	   is	   in	  contrast	  to	  the	  reading	  in	  of	  an	  additional	  exception	  in	  the	  CFC	  rules	  in	  Vodafone	  
2	   (EWCA)	   which	   was	   seen	   as	   permissible	   since	   the	   legislation	   itself	   already	  contained	  a	   list	  of	  qualifying	  exceptions	  and	  adding	  another	  one	  was	  simply	  an	  extension	  of	  that	  principle.	  	  Having	  ruled	  out	  a	  conforming	   interpretation,	   the	  court	   then	   turned	  to	  analyse	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  legislation	  should	  be	  disapplied.	  	  Henderson	  J	  ruled	  that	  the	  thin	  cap	  rules	  should	  be	  disapplied	  where	  they	  relate	  to	  transactions	  with	  a	  commercial	  rationale:	  	  
“The	  right	  solution	  …	  is	  to	  disapply	  the	  national	  rules	  only	  in	  relation	  
to	  transactions	  which	  satisfy	  the	  test	  of	  commercial	  justification”130	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  129	  Para.	  83,	  Thin	  Cap	  GLO	  130	  Para.	  94,	  Thin	  Cap	  GLO	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The	  court	  did	  acknowledge	   that	   the	   result	  of	  disapplying	   the	   legislation	   in	   this	  way	   had	   a	   similar	   effect	   to	   that	   which	   may	   have	   been	   achieved	   through	   a	  conforming	   interpretation,	   but	   it	   ruled	   that	   such	   an	   approach	   was	   consistent	  with	   the	   requirement	   to	   disapply	   the	   offending	   legislation	   only	   in	   so	   far	   as	   to	  remedy	  the	  breach	  of	  EU	  law:	  	  
“The	  crucial	  point,	  so	  far	  as	  disapplication	  is	  concerned,	  is	  to	  identify	  
the	  nature	  of	  the	  infringement	  of	  Community	  law	  which	  the	  ECJ	  has	  
found	  to	  be	  established,	  and	  then	   to	  perform	  the	  necessary	  surgery	  
on	   the	   offending	   national	   legislation	   so	   as	   to	   give	   effect	   to	   the	  
claimant's	  Community	  rights.	  Such	  surgery,	  to	  pursue	  the	  metaphor,	  
need	  not	  always	  consist	  of	  amputation	  of	  a	  limb	  or	  the	  removal	  of	  a	  
diseased	  organ,	  but	  may	  in	  appropriate	  cases	  be	  of	  a	  reconstructive	  
nature.”131	  
	  	  
8.5. Thin	  Cap	  GLO	  –	  some	  observations	  	  This	  approach	  by	  the	  High	  Court	  is	  interesting	  because	  it	  shows	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	   achieve	   similar	   results	   to	   those	   which	   may	   result	   from	   a	   conforming	  interpretation	   exercise	   (as	   in	   Vodafone	   2)	   by	   employing	   the	   principle	   of	  disapplication132,	  but	  that	  such	  techniques	  do	  remain	  very	  different	  methods	  of	  addressing	  breaches	  of	  EU	  law	  obligations.	  	  	  
9. Conclusions	  	  However	   many	   times	   one	   reads	   s747	   ICTA	   1988,	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	   find	   any	  words	  which	   exclude	   from	   a	   CFC	   apportionment	   charge	   a	   subsidiary	  which	   is	  “actually	  established	   in	  another	  member	  state	  of	   the	  EEA	  and	  carries	  on	  genuine	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  131	  Para.	  97,	  Thin	  Cap	  GLO	  132	  Farmer	  &	  Coutinho,	  p.18	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economic	  activities	  there”.	   	  On	   the	  basis	   that	   the	  words	  do	  not	  exist,	  how	  could	  one	  read	  in	  this	  exception	  to	  the	  CFC	  rules?	  	  This	  was	  the	  starting	  point	  of	  the	  discussion	  which	  has	  moved	  from	  a	  review	  of	  the	   traditional	   approach	   to	   statutory	   interpretation,	   under	   which	   it	   would	  arguably	   never	   have	   been	   possible	   to	   reach	   an	   interpretation	   of	   the	   CFC	   rules	  such	   as	   that	   put	   forward	  by	   the	  Court	   of	  Appeal	   in	  Vodafone	  2,	   through	   to	   the	  acknowledgement	  that	  such	  an	  approach	  is	  entirely	  appropriate	  and	  consistent	  with	  the	  principles	  of	  conforming	  construction.	  	  How	  was	  it	  possible	  to	  reach	  this	  conclusion?	  	  Some	   see	   the	   judgment	   in	   Vodafone	   2	   as	   evidence	   of	   the	   courts’	   increasing	  willingness	   to	   “legislate”	   on	   behalf	   of	   Parliament,	   and	   cannot	   see	   how	   such	   a	  conclusion	  could	  have	  been	  reached133.	  	  In	  a	  comparable	  domestic	  situation,	  such	  as	   Mayes,	   there	   was	   a	   simple	   reading	   of	   the	   legislation	   by	   the	   court	   and	   a	  confirmation	   that	   purposive	   construction	   does	   not	   permit	   the	   rewriting	   of	  legislation,	  which	  is	  the	  accepted	  domestic	  view	  of	  interpretation.	  	  Indeed,	  even	  when	  asked	  to	  consider	  legislation	  which	  interacted	  with	  EU	  law	  obligations	  as	  in	  Macarthys	  Ltd	  v	  Smith,	  the	  court	  originally	  had	  difficulty	  applying	  a	  meaning	  to	  the	  words	  other	  than	  their	  literal	  one.	  	  Even	   in	   Pfeiffer,	   the	   ECJ	   acknowledged	   that	   the	   application	   of	   interpretative	  methods	   by	   national	   courts	   was	   limited	   to	   those	   methods	   as	   permitted	   by	  national	  law.	   	  This	  begs	  the	  question	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  –	  given	  the	  domestic	  jurisprudence	  in	  the	  field	  of	  statutory	  interpretation	  –	  the	  techniques	  adopted	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  in	  Vodafone	  2	  were	  indeed	  permitted	  under	  national	  law.	  	  The	  key	  to	  answering	  this	  question	  and	  therefore	  understanding	  the	  judgment	  is	  found	   in	   the	  obligations	  conferred	  on	  Parliament	  and	  the	   judiciary	   through	  the	  European	   Communities	   Act	   1972.	   	   It	   was	   this	   Act	   which	   established	   the	  supremacy	  of	  EU	  law	  in	  the	  UK,	  and	  furthermore	  it	  was	  this	  Act	  which	  obliged	  –	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  133	  As	  acknowledged	  in	  footnote	  1,	  this	  was	  the	  previously	  held	  view	  of	  the	  author.	  
Candidate	  number:	  R6604	  
	   53	  
and	  continues	  to	  oblige	  –	  courts	  to	  use	  all	  options	  available	  in	  order	  to	  interpret	  domestic	  legislation	  in	  accordance	  with	  EU	  law.	  	  	  	  The	  ECA	  1972	  amended	  and	  extended	  the	  permitted	  methods	  of	   interpretation	  under	  UK	  domestic	   law.	   	  Once	  one	  accepts	  this	  truth,	  the	  jurisprudence	  both	  in	  the	   ECJ	   and	   the	   domestic	   courts	   serves	   only	   to	   support	   the	   assertion	   that	   the	  addition	  of	  an	  additional	  exception	  to	  the	  CFC	  rules	  was	  a	  logical	  outcome	  of	  the	  courts’	  obligation	  to	  conform	  with	  EU	  law.	  	  One	  natural	  question	  which	  flows	  from	  this	  is	  whether	  or	  not	  this	  expansion	  of	  the	   interpretative	   tools	  at	   the	  courts’	  disposal	   in	   the	   field	  of	  EU	   law	  has	   in	  any	  way	  refocused	  the	  way	  in	  which	  domestic	  legislation	  can	  be	  interpreted.	   	  Given	  the	  constraints	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  legal	  certainty	  –	  particularly	  in	  relation	  to	  tax	  matters	  –	   it	   is	  not	  clear	   that	  courts	  would	  be	  willing	   to	  go	  as	   far	   in	  a	  domestic	  context.	  	  	  	  However,	   the	   purposive	   approach	   to	   domestic	   legislative	   interpretation	   does	  bear	  some	  of	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  approach	  adopted	  in	  the	  field	  of	  EU	  law;	  one	  need	  only	  look	  at	  how	  the	  courts	  viewed	  composite	  transactions	  in	  Furniss	  v	  
Dawson	   and	   then	   again	   more	   recently	   in	   Scottish	   Provident	   and	   Astall	   to	  understand	  that	  the	  courts	  are	  willing	  to	  interpret	  domestic	  legislation	  in	  a	  way	  which	   is	   not	   based	   solely	   on	   the	   literal	  meaning	   of	   the	  words.	   	   In	   a	   sense,	   the	  techniques	  used	  in	  the	  EU	  law	  field	  are	  just	  a	  widening	  of	  principles	  which	  have	  been	  already	  consistently	  applied	  in	  domestic	  jurisprudence.	  	  To	  address	  a	  separate	  point,	  as	  is	  apparent	  from	  comparisons	  between	  Thin	  Cap	  
GLO	   and	   Vodafone	   2	   (EWCA),	   it	   is	   sometimes	   possible	   to	   achieve	   through	  disapplication	  a	  result	  similar	  to	  that	  which	  would	  be	  achieved	  through	  applying	  a	   conforming	   interpretation.	   	   In	   this	   context,	   would	   it	   have	   been	   more	  appropriate	  for	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  simply	  to	  have	  ruled	  that	  where	  substance	  in	  an	  EU	  resident	  CFC	  could	  be	  proved,	  the	  CFC	  legislation	  should	  be	  disapplied?	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This	   argument	   has	   some	   compelling	   factors	   in	   its	   favour.	   	   ECJ	   jurisprudence,	  particularly	   in	   the	   field	   of	   direct	   tax,	   has	   developed	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   “negative	  integration”;	   that	   is	   to	  say,	   the	  Treaty	  and	   the	   fundamental	   freedoms	  generally	  stipulate	  what	  member	  states	  are	  not	  permitted	  to	  do,	  rather	  than	  what	  they	  can	  do.	   	   On	   this	   basis,	   it	   could	   be	   argued	   that	   instead	   of	   trying	   to	   construe	   the	  legislation	   in	   a	  way	  which	  makes	   it	   compatible	  with	  EU	   law,	   rather	   the	   courts	  should	   read	   it	   in	   a	   way	   which	   excludes	   those	   elements	   which	   make	   it	  incompatible.	  	  Having	  said	  that,	  it	  is	  not	  an	  argument	  which	  can	  be	  sustained	  for	  a	  number	  of	  different	  reasons	  –	  all	  of	  which	  have	  a	  different	  underlying	  premise	  upon	  which	  they	  are	  based.	  	  	  	  Firstly,	   and	   clearly,	   the	  obligation	  of	  domestic	   courts	   to	   interpret	   legislation	   in	  accordance	   with	   EU	   law	   principles	   is	   enshrined	   in	   the	   statute	   book	   and	   until	  Parliament	  decides	  to	  remove	  this	  obligation	  it	  should	  be	  respected.	  	  Secondly,	  many	  comparisons	  in	  the	  jurisprudence	  are	  made	  to	  the	  requirement	  under	  s3	  of	  the	  HRA	  1998	  for	  courts	  to	  interpret	  legislation	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  UK’s	   obligations	   under	   that	   Act.	   	   Indeed,	   the	  main	   principle	   of	   conforming	  construction	  espoused	  in	  Vodafone	  2	  (EWCA)	  was	  that	  the	  interpretation	  should	  “go	  with	  the	  grain”	  of	  the	  legislation	  and	  this	  concept	  was	  argued	  in	  Ghaidan.	  	  	  	  In	   the	   context	   of	   human	   rights,	   failure	   to	   reach	   a	   conforming	   interpretation	  renders	   the	   offending	   legislation	   incompatible	  with	   the	   human	   rights	   at	   stake.	  	  To	  subject	  UK	  citizens	  to	  obligations	  under	  domestic	  legislation	  which	  has	  been	  ruled	  directly	  incompatible	  with	  their	  human	  rights	  is	  an	  emotive	  conclusion	  to	  reach.	  	  It	  is	  this	  author’s	  contention	  that	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  courts	  feel	  able	  to	  apply	  under	  s3	  HRA	  1998	  a	  broader	  set	  of	  interpretative	  principles	  to	  legislation	  when	  assessing	  its	  compatibility	  with	  human	  rights.	  	  The	  effect	  of	  this	  has	  spilled	  over	  into,	  and	  been	  complemented	  by,	  an	  analogous	  approach	  to	  interpretation	  in	  the	  field	  of	  EU	  law.	  	  Finally,	  perhaps	  a	  somewhat	  more	  contentious	  reason	  why	  courts	  will	  continue	  to	   prefer	   a	   conforming	   interpretation	   approach	   over	   that	   of	   disapplication.	   	   In	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tax	  cases,	  the	  courts	  have	  ruled	  that	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  where	  disapplication	  is	  employed	  rests	  with	  HMRC.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  Thin	  Cap	  GLO	  HMRC	  is	  required	  to	  prove	  that	  the	  loans	  granted	  were	  not	  at	  arm’s	  length	  and	  therefore	  the	  resulting	  interest	  deduction	  should	  be	  denied.	   	  The	  author	  invites	  you	  simply	  to	  contrast	  this	   with	   a	   conforming	   interpretation	   approach	   in	   Vodafone	   2,	   where	   the	  taxpayer	  was	  under	   the	  obligation	   to	  prove	   that	   it	  had	  a	  genuinely	  established	  subsidiary	  in	  an	  EEA	  country,	  and	  consequently	  ended	  up	  settling	  with	  HMRC	  for	  a	  cool	  £1.25bn.	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